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Anthony Lewis's classic account of the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,' Gideon's Trumpet, includes a
letter written by Clarence Earl Gideon to his court-appointed lawyer, Abe
2Fortas. Gideon had written in response to Fortas's request for a detailed
biographical description of his life.3 Complying with his lawyer's request,
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1. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental right).
2. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 65-68 (1966). Only two years after the Gideon
decision, President Lyndon B. Johnson nominated Abe Fortas to the Supreme Court. See LAURA
KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 244-47 (1990).
3. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 64-65. Abe Fortas asked Gideon for an autobiographical letter
to determine if Gideon was illiterate or perhaps suffered from a mental defect because, under the
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Gideon wrote a lengthy narrative recounting the sad trajectory of his troubled
life that first took form in the hardscrabble counties of southwestern Missouri.
Gideon's poignant biographical letter ended with these simple but eloquent
words:
I have no illusions about law and courts or the people who are
involved in them. I have read the complete history of law ever since
the Romans first started writing them down and before the laws of
religions. I believe that each era finds a [sic] improvement in law
each year brings something new for the benefit of mankind. Maybe
this will be one of those small steps forward. 5
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court made such an advancement by
recognizing that an indigent criminal defendant in a state felony prosecution
6has a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Although the right to counsel
in state court criminal proceedings established by Gideon is undoubtedly one
of our nation's proudest constitutional achievements, 7 over five decades later
Betts v. Brady special circumstances doctrine, if a state criminal defendant suffered from insanity
or, perhaps illiteracy, due process could require appointment of counsel in a noncapital state
felony prosecution. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 180-82; see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-73
(1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. Fortas was concerned about this issue because the
Court indicated it was going to consider whether Betts should be overruled. KALMAN, supra note
2, at 181-82. Interestingly, however, when a cousin of Fortas inquired whether he had any desire
to meet his client, Fortas responded, "Why the hell would I want to meet a son of a bitch like
that?" Id at 181.
4. LEWIS, supra note 2, at 65-78.
5. Id. at78.
6. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44. The same day Gideon was decided, the Court in Douglas
v. California held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, due process and equal protection
compel the provision of appellate counsel to indigent state criminal defendants. 372 U.S. 353
(1963). Further expanding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel less than a decade later, the
Court, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, found that, "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial." 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). Five years after Argersinger, a
divided court in Scott v. Illinois limited the scope of Argersinger by imposing a requirement of
actual imprisonment to activate the right to counsel. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). Justice
William Rehnquist, writing for the five-member majority, distinguished the imposition of a fine
and the mere threat of imprisonment from actual imprisonment. Id. at 373.
7. See LEWIS, supra note 2, at 201-07 (discussing the reaction of the states and the post-
decision thoughts of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Thomas Clark). Gideon was a
tremendously important constitutional milestone; however, the resulting state structures
responsible for indigent-criminal defense are burdened by chronic underfunding to the degree that
the promise of Gideon remains an elusive one in many states and localities. See Mary Sue
Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 1031, 1045-52 (2006); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial
of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783,
783-86, 793-94; see Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a
Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 142, 152-
56 (2009). Earlier this year, President Barack Obama named Harvard Law School professor,
Laurence Tribe, Senior Counselor for Access to Justice in the Department of Justice. Tribe's
mandate is to improve access to counsel in both criminal and civil matters. Tribe Named Senior
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poor Americans enjoy no similar right to counsel in our civil justice system. 8
Whether a person is facing homelessness from foreclosure or eviction, is
wrongfully denied eligibility for Supplemental Security Income benefits, is
erroneously denied coverage under the federal Medicaid statute for a life-
sustaining medical treatment or medication, is arbitrarily denied
unemployment benefits, or is faced with an abusive consumer-collection suit,
access to legal representation in civil cases in the United States continues to
turn largely on the random and irrational calculus of wealth. 9
In the years since Gideon v. Wainwright, efforts to establish a commensurate
federal constitutional right to counsel in civil proceedings for persons unable to
afford private counsel have been weighted down and constitutionally hindered
by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services.'0 In Lassiter, the Supreme Court determined that due process did not
require appointment of a state-funded attorney for Abby Gail Lassiter (Ms.
Lassiter), the impoverished mother whose parental rights were being
terminated." The Court held that, in termination of parental rights cases,
whether an indigent parent is entitled to appointed counsel must be decided on
a case-by-case basis.
2
Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the five-member majority, configured a
due process inquiry using the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor balancing
test.' That test was then measured against a presumption that there is no such
right to counsel except in those instances "where the litigant may lose his
physical liberty if he loses the litigation."' 14 Using this legal calculus, the Court
explained that "as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does
his right to appointed counsel.' 15  The Court's adoption of a case-by-case
Counselor of Access to Justice, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: NEWS & EVENTS, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2010/02/26_tribe.senior.counselor.html.
8. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30-33 (1981) (holding that, under the
particular circumstances of the case, the indigent parent facing termination of her parental rights
did not have a constitutional right to counsel at state expense, and that there is a presumption
against finding such a right in the absence of a deprivation of physical liberty).
9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1, 3 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/
pdfs/documentingthejusticegapin america 2009.pdf [hereinafter LSC JUSTICE GAP
REPORT]; cf Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with
the Rest of the Developed World, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 769, 771-72 (2006)
(explaining that at least forty-nine European countries are required to provide publicly funded
legal assistance and discussing the scope of the available services).
10. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
11. Id. at 20, 31-33.
12. Id. at31-33.
13. Id. at 27- 28; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
14. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
15. Id. at26.
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standard 16 and its use of a presumption grounded on personal liberty in
Lassiter quickly extinguished any hope that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment might be used to establish either a categorical right for
indigent parents facing the permanent severance of their familial bonds or a
broader fight to counsel in other types of civil cases.'
In the intervening years since Lassiter, there has been a steadily increasing
crescendo of criticism of the Court's decision by legal scholars and poverty
lawyers, 8 along with an increasing number of organized efforts around the
nation directed at establishing a civil right to counsel either through state
judicial decision or by legislative action.' Both academics and poverty law
advocates have mapped out and developed numerous strategies, theories, and
20
approaches to establish a civil right to counsel. Some scholars and advocates
have focused on establishing a right to counsel in selected substantive areas of
the law, such as eviction and housing matters, deportation proceedings, welfare
hearings, medical-benefits proceedings, proceedings involving domestic
violence, and child dependency proceedings. 21
16. In Lassiter, the Court explicitly adopted the case-by-case standard articulated in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. Under Gagnon, in a
probation-revocation administrative-proceeding, there must be a colorable claim that the
probationer had not violated his probation or there must exist mitigating reasons regarding why
the violation should not result in revocation, as well as an inability on the part of the probationer
to effectively develop his defense or present his defense on his own without the assistance of
counsel. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790-91. The agency retains discretion to determine whether
counsel is necessary based on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 790.
17. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32; see Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a
Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (1998) (describing general inadequacies resulting
from the Lassiter decision).
18. See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 635, 650 (2006) ("[R]eassessment of Lassiter's
treatment of parents' fundamental liberty interest in their relationships with their children is now
... overdue."); Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 63-64 (2007) (criticizing the majority
opinion for its use of a presumption of no fight to counsel and its treatment of parents' interests in
its due process analysis); Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor,
HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8, 8 (arguing that Lassiter "is remarkably out of step with the
demands of equal justice"); Sweet, supra note 17, at 505-06 (calling for reversal of the Lassiter
decision).
19. See Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the
Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TouRO L. REV. 131, 132-34 (2009) (describing current efforts by
advocates in eleven states and also nationwide to establish and expand a right to counsel in civil
proceedings).
20. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
21. See Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in
Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 557, 559 (2006); Raymond H.
Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 187, 190-92 (2009) (providing an overview of efforts to establish a civil right to counsel);
Kia C. Franklin, Advocacy in Health Proceedings in New York State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 437,
1060 [Vol. 59:1057
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Scholars and advocates have also examined the right to counsel in the
context of a particular doctrinal theory or strategy22 as well as in the context of
a particular population, 23 while others have examined the issue through the
prism of an international framework.24  State constitutions have also been the
focal point of scholarly attention as a source on which to ground a right to
counsel. 2  These efforts gained momentum in 2006 when the American Bar
Association (ABA) adopted a resolution calling for a publicly funded civil
right to counsel "limited to those cases where the most basic of human needs
are at stake," such as those involving "shelter, sustenance, safety, health and
child custody." 26  The ABA Resolution offered the hope that "the U.S.
Supreme Court will eventually reconsider the cumbersome Lassiter balancing
test and the unreasonable presumption that renders the test irrelevant for almost
all civil litigants."
27
440-42 (2009); Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 273, 279-81 (2009); Erik
Pitchal, Children 's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 663, 667 (2006); Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in
Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 699,
700-03 (2006) (arguing that policy and due process demand a civil right to counsel in judicial
proceedings); Rachel Kleinman, Comment, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call:
Immigrants Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
393, 393-96 (2000) (arguing for a per se right in deportation hearings).
22. See Deborah Perluss, Keeping the Eyes on the Prize: Visualizing the Civil Right to
Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 719, 720 (2006) (arguing that access to justice is a
separate, independently substantive, enforceable, personal right).
23. See, e.g., Lisa Brodoffet al., The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel Before a Full
Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 609, 612 (2004) ("[A]II civil litigants with disabilities that
prevent them from understanding or participating in the legal system should receive appointed
counsel.").
24. See Lidman, supra note 9; see also Martha F. Davis, In the Interests of Justice: Human
Rights and the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 25 TOURO L. REV. 147, 152 (2009) (discussing
materials that support "the proposition that a right to counsel in civil cases is an emerging human
right necessary to the 'interests of justice,' and is gaining increasing acceptance in the
international community").
25. See, e.g., Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to
Counsel in Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 733 (2006) ("[P]rocedural
due process grounded in state constitutional provisions ... has real potential to expand the right
to counsel in civil cases through state court litigation.").
26. TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 12-13 (2006) [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION], available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A I 2A.pdf. The report noted that
"more than ten years have passed since [the 1994 study], and matters have only gotten worse."
Id. at 5; see LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-14, 17-18.
27. ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 26, at 6. At its annual meeting in August of this year,
the ABA House of Delegates will take up a proposed ABA Model Access Act and related ABA
Basic Principles of a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings. See SECTION ON LITIGATION,
ET AL., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter ABA
2010 REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/
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In this Article, I return to where Lassiter began and ended, with Ms.
Lassiter's poverty, her fractured life, and her claim for a greater measure of
28due process. I argue simply that Ms. Lassiter's two greatest disadvantages
were the five-member majority's perception that she was a member of the
"undeserving poor"29 and the Court's policy concern that recognizing a per se
right to counsel in parental-termination proceedings would open the door to
further extensions of the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Thus, I contend
that poverty and policy concerns30 were more determinative than precedent in
the Court's internal deliberative process. Using the personal papers of Justice
Lewis Powell and Justice Harry Blackmun, I explore how the facts of Ms.
ModelActReportRec_06232010.pdf; STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2010) [hereinafter BASIC
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/atjresourcecenter/
downloads/BasicPrinciples-Civil RTCRpt withRec_4_20_10.pdf. The model act offers
states a statutory framework for implementing a civil right to counsel. See ABA 2010 REPORT,
supra, app. at 1-12. It contains legislative findings, a set of operative definitions, a section that
delineates the contours of the right to counsel, sections on establishing a state oversight agency to
administer such a program, and a funding process for implementing the right to counsel in civil
cases. See id. Specifically, the sections on funding give states the prerogative to determine the
funding-mechanism source. Id. at 8-12. The ABA Basic Principles establish the requirements
and criteria for providing a civil right to counsel and address issues such as financial eligibility,
professional and ethical concerns, caseloads, training, compensation, and notice to eligible
litigants. See BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra, app. at 1-12. Under the Basic Principles, the right to
counsel is provided in "adversarial proceedings where basic human needs ... are at stake." Id.
app. at 1.
28. See discussion infra Part II.
29. See MICHAEL B..KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 11-16 (1989) [hereinafter KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR]. Katz
explains that the concept of the undeserving poor rests on the belief that the condition of the poor
"results from some attribute, a defect in personality" and the poor, because they have "fail[ed] to
contribute or to prosper" suffer under the burden of a persistent theme of moral condemnation.
Id. at 6-7, 236; see HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 1-3 (1995) (examining the use of the term "undeserving poor" as a
pejorative label that serves to "stereotype, stigmatize and harass the poor by questioning their
morality and their values"); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA, at xi-xii (1986) (explaining how poverty has been treated as
a moral failure).
30. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 21, at 307-08 (positing that in Lassiter, the
Court's refusal to enforce a right to counsel under the due process clause is an example of an
under-enforced constitutional norm and reflects an institutional "rehictance to impose what it
regards as substantial fiscal liabilities on state governments"); see also Lowell F. Schechter, The
Pitfalls of Timidity: The Ramifications of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 8 N. KY. L.
REV. 435, 470-71 (1981) ("Justice Stewart's creation of the presumption is not a matter of
precedential necessity, but of policy choice.").
31. See generally Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 331, folder 1) [hereinafter Blackmun Papers];
Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (1981), in
Papers of Justice Louis F. Powell (Washington and Lee University School of Law, box 223)
[hereinafter Powell Papers].
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Lassiter's troubled and impoverished life affected the Court's decision, but in a
way that was inapposite to how those facts should have structurally influenced
the Court's formal due process analysis-and its understanding of fundamental
fairness. I argue that the facts determined to be the most damning against Ms.
Lassiter offered the most compelling reasons why due process should have
entitled her to legal representation. Finally, I argue that due process remains a
viable, constitutional basis on which to ground a civil right to counsel and that
the Court should reconsider and overrule its 1981 decision in Lassiter.
The Article begins with an examination of the scope of the need for legal
counsel in civil proceedings and the practical difficulties faced by poor
litigants who must proceed without the benefit of legal counsel. In Part II, it
examines Justice Stewart's use of the facts in Lassiter and how the Court's
decision was influenced by Ms. Lassiter's status as a member of the
undeserving poor. Next, in Part III, it explores and examines the policy
concerns that informed the Court's decision-making process. Part IV examines
Justice Stewart's due process analysis and his use of the Court's precedent to
support a presumption against appointment of counsel in the absence of a risk
of loss of physical liberty. In Part V, it sets out to explain that a conception of
due process that is sensitive to concerns beyond efficiency offers a viable
constitutional path to pursue a civil right to counsel.
Before proceeding further, a note on source material is appropriate. Scholars
and other legal commentators have generally focused their attention and their
analysis of Lassiter on the formal opinions written by Chief Justice Warren
Burger and Justices Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens.
32
This Article, in addition to examining the formal opinions produced by the
Court, draws on the personal papers of Justices Blackmun and Powell to help
illuminate and understand the policy concerns that animated the Court's
disquisition on due process. The notes taken by Justices Blackmun and Powell
in their own handwriting, which recorded what each of the justices said during
their private conference together, offer a useful historical window into the
Court's deliberative process.33  Of the nine justices who participated in the
Lassiter decision, the papers of five of the justices are currently open to the
public. In addition to Justices Blackmun and Powell, the papers of Justice
William Brennan, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall are available for use
by the public.34  Justice Stewart's papers reveal little about his internal
32. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 18, at 63-64, 72-75.
33. See sources cited supra note 31.
34. Access to Justice William Brennan's papers requires permission from the Library of
Congress. E-mail from Bruce Kirby, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Library of Congress, to
Robert Hornstein, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (July 23, 2009,
14:46 EST) (on file with author). Persons interested in using the Brennan papers must submit a
request explaining the intended use. Id. Certain portions of Brennan's papers, however, are
currently not open to the public. Id. Justice Stewart's papers were donated to Yale University
Library. E-mail from Rebecca Hatcher, Archivist, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, to
Robert Hornstein, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (May 5, 2009,
2010] 1063
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deliberative process or anything about the views of the other members of the
Court. His papers do not include his conference notes, though they do include
a circulation sheet noting whether each justice would join his majority
opinion. 35 Similarly, neither the Marshall nor the Brennan papers contain any
conference notes from Lassiter.36 The personal papers of Chief Justice Warren
Burger and Justices Byron White and John Paul Stevens are not yet available
for public inspection.
3Y
The unavailability of all of the participating justices' conference notes, to
some degree, necessarily renders any picture that can be drawn of the Court's
deliberations-using only the Blackmun and Powell papers-an incomplete
one. Admittedly, the value of this evidence is further limited to some extent
because Justices Powell and Blackmun might not have accurately recorded or
captured all that was actually said at conference by the other justices.
Nevertheless, their individual conference notes provide historical insight into
the views and concerns of all nine justices.38
16:10 EST) (on file with author). The deed of gift restricted access to case materials until all
justices who served with Justice Stewart have retired from the Court. Id. Justice John Paul
Stevens, who retired from the Court at the end of the 2009-2010 Term, was the last remaining
justice on the Court to have served with Justice Stewart. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage,
Stevens's Retirement is Political Test for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/04/1 0/us/politics/I Ostevens.html; see Posting of Tony Mauro to Blog of Legal
Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.comfblt/2010/07/live-from-new-haven-the-potter-stewart-papers.
html (July 13, 2010, 11:45 EST).
35. Circulation Sheet of Justice Potter Stewart, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham
(1981), in Papers of Justice Potter Stewart (Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Sterling
Memorial Library, New Haven, Connecticut, box 450, folder 5607).
36. Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., box 279); Papers of Justice William Brennan (Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 1:548).
37. Chief Justice Warren Burger donated his papers to the College of William and Mary, but
his papers are closed to researchers until 2026. See Warren E. Burger Online Exhibit - Earl
Gregg Swem Library, http://swem.wm.edu/exhibits/burger/index.cfm (last visited July 24, 2010).
Justice Byron White's papers are currently closed until the year 2012. E-mail from Lia Apodaca,
Manuscript Reference Librarian, Library of Congress, to Robert Hornstein, Assistant Professor of
Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (May 19, 2009, 10:54 EST) (on file with author). Justice
Rehnquist donated his papers to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Portions of Justice
Rehnquist's Supreme Court papers have been opened to researchers; however, materials from
cases heard between the October 1975 and 2005 Terms are closed during the lifetime of any
member of the Court who participated in one of those decisions. See Press Release, Hoover
Institution, Rehnquist Papers: Finding Aid for Materials from 1947 to 1974 Available to
Researchers on November 17, 2008, http://www.hoover.org/hila/announcements/news/34359614
.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
38. In this regard, it is worth observing that the conference notes of Justices Powell and
Blackmun are consistent with one another in what they report. Powell's conference notes contain
slightly more detail and document his own position and the views he expressed at the conference.
See Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423
(1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31. Blackmun's notes, however, do not record the views he
may have expressed at the Court's private conference. See Conference Notes of Justice Harry A.
1064 [Vol. 59:1057
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I. TROUBLE So HARD: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO CIVIL
GIDEON
Lack of access to counsel is a serious problem for tens of millions of poor
Americans.39 This is particularly troubling in a constitutional democracy that
is anchored to the rule of law and accepts as an article of public faith the
principle that, regardless of one's station in life, whether it be high or low, all
Americans stand equal before the bar of justice. For too many Americans,
however, the price of equal justice is simply beyond their means.40  Fifteen
years ago, the ABA conducted a nationwide study that revealed legal
assistance was unavailable for over seventy percent of the serious legal needs
of the poor.4 1  The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), created in 1974 to
42provide poor Americans access to the nation's civil justice system, issued a
report in 2009, Documenting the Justice Gap in America, which shows that the
poor received legal assistance from a legal services organization or a pro bono
private attorney for less than one in every five types of legal problems that
were identified.
43
More recently, studies done by states and other private and governmental
organizations continue to document that civil legal representation for most
poor Americans in the United States is unavailable, and the need has not
Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra
note 31.
39. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET
REQUEST 3, 5-12 (2008), available at http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/budgetrequestfy2009.pdf
[hereinafter LSC 2009 BUDGET REQUEST].
40. See Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem
of Wealth, 67 MD. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (2007) (explaining that "[t]he existence of the 'two
Americas' has long been and continues to be a matter of statistical fact" and examining "the
constitutional significance of wealth in a democracy").
41. See AM. BAR ASS'N CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PUB., LEGAL NEEDS AND
CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 27 (1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf (concluding from 1993 data that "[n]early
three quarters (71 percent) of these situations faced by low-income households are not finding
their way to the justice system").
42. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY,
SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 22 (2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/
0158.pdf ("The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 was one of the last bills that President
Nixon signed into law before he resigned from office in August 1974."); see also Warren E.
George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 681-83
(1976); William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph ofLegalAid: Congress
and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
241, 251-64 (1998); cf EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 34 (1974) (chronicling the development of federal
support for legal assistance for the poor).
43. LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
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diminished since the seminal 1994 ABA study.44 For example, in Wisconsin
and New Mexico, eighty percent of poor families in need of legal assistance
must proceed without the benefit of counsel.45 Poor people in Utah fare even
worse when it comes to access to justice. Over eighty-seven percent of the
poor in Utah with a legal problem go forward without representation. 46  In
California, sixty-six percent of the legal needs of the poor go unmet 7  In
Maine last year, the state's six nonprofit legal assistance programs conducted a
two-month survey and found that less than one in four poor people seeking
legal assistance received legal representation.48 The 2009 Maine survey also
found that in the first six months of this year, the demand for legal assistance
by Maine's poor increased thirty percent over the number of requests for
assistance during the same period from the previous year.49 Persons faced with
eviction in the courtrooms of New Jersey go unrepresented in ninety-nine
percent of cases.50 The first study done in New Jersey since 2002 of the unmet
legal needs of the state's poor found that one-third of that state's poor
encounter legal problems each year, but "only 20 percent of those who need
legal help actually get it."
5 1
44. LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, passim; ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 26, at
5.
45. LSC 2009 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 39, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. On October 12, 2009, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law
Assembly Bill 590, creating a three-year civil-counsel pilot project for needy Californians in
cases that implicate basic human needs. See Assem. B. No. 590, 2009-2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2009). One of the legislative findings in the bill states that "the critical need for legal
representation in civil cases has been documented repeatedly, and the statistics are staggering."
Id. § l(b). The California legislature found that "[o]ver 4.3 million Californians are believed to
be currently unrepresented in civil court proceedings, largely because they cannot afford
representation." Id. Importantly, the bill recognizes that "[b]ecause in many civil cases lawyers
are as essential as judges and courts to the proper functioning of the justice system, the state has
just as great a responsibility to ensure adequate counsel is available to both parties in those cases
as it does to supply judges [and] courthouses." Id. § 1(j). Under the bill, the pilot projects will
commence on July 1, 2011, and last for three years, concluding with reports to the governor and
legislature. Id. § 3. The bill will be funded by setting aside ten dollars of existing fees for certain
court services to support the pilot projects. Id.
48. Legal Aid Agencies Face Loss of Funding, Growing Demand, KENNEBEC J., Sept. 26,
2009, available at http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/news/local/6902998.html.
49. Id.
50. LSC 2009 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 39, at 7; see Nina Ingwer Van Wormer, Help
at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 983, 988 (2007) (pointing out that both federal and state courts "have seen significant
increases in the number of self-represented civil litigants in recent years"); Stephan Landsman,
The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 443 (2009)
(noting data available for 2006 and 2007 shows "that pro se filings in the [federal] courts of
appeal are substantial [and accounted for] approximately forty-three percent of all appeals").
51. Mary Fuchs, The Needy Struggle in Civil Court Cases, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssP/base/news-15/
1254098708212950.xml&coll = .
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Today, the ranks of the poor include over forty million Americans and their
numbers are expected to grow at an accelerated pace during the worst
economic conditions since the Great Depression. 52 The 2009 LSC Justice Gap
Report sadly confirmed that the poor's lack of access to legal representation
across the nation remains a systemic problem,53 one that stands in sharp
contradiction to our national creed of equal justice.54 Almost fifty million
Americans earn an income small enough to qualify them for representation by
an LSC-funded legal services program. 55 It also found that nearly half of the
people who apply for assistance from a LSC program are turned away because
of limited resources.
56
52. Jason DeParle & Robert Gebeloff, Living on Nothing But Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2010, at Al; Erik Eckholm, Last Year's Poverty Rate Was Highest in 12 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at A 12; see Julie Bosman, Summer Brings a Wave of Homeless Families,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at AI; Erik Eckholm, Safety Net Is Fraying for the Very Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2009, at Al5; Peter S. Goodman, Joblessness Hits 9.5%, Deflating Recovery
Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A 1. A report by the Center for American Progress projects
that more than 12.4 million more persons will fall into poverty if the unemployment rate reaches
eleven percent in 2010. JAMES KVAAL & BEN FURNAS, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
RECESSION, POVERTY AND THE RECOVERY ACT: MILLIONS AT RISK OF FALLING OUT OF
MIDDLE CLASS 2 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/pdf/
recessionpoverty.pdf. The report also notes that "[t]he Congressional Budget Office projects
that the unemployment rate could reach 9 percent in 2010." Id.
53. LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 27-28.
54. See Deborah M. Weisman, Law As Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 741, 827-28 (2002) (arguing "that despite the resonance of the
national narrative of the Rule of Law, this ideal is subordinate to the ideology of self-sufficiency"
and, as a consequence, it has been commodified such that, in the absence of the ability to pay for
this benefit, the poor's access to justice is rendered in the form of charity, thereby diminishing
any claim of constitutional entitlement).
55. LSC 2009 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 39, at 11. The 2009 congressional budget
appropriation for the Legal Services Corporation was 390 million dollars. LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
LSC's FY 2010 BUDGET IN BRIEF, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/legal services/Iscfy
10onepager.pdf. By way of comparison, the nation's twenty highest-grossing law firms had a
gross revenue of $26,063,500,000 in 2008. Thirteen Firms Gross over $1 Billion, AM. LAW.,
May 2009, at 151, 151. On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed into law the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010. This bill provides four hundred twenty million dollars
in funding for LSC, a thirty million dollar increase over the LSC's 2009 funding. Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit. IV, 123 Stat. 3034, 3148 (2009).
56. LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-3, 12. The most recent data available
from LSC shows that in 2007, a total of 899,140 individual clients were served by LSC funded
legal services programs. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FACT BOOK
2007 17 (2008), available at http://www.Isc.gov/pdfs/factbook2007.pdf. LSC-funded programs
in 2007 closed 906,507 cases. Id. at 10. This figure reflects the combined number of cases
handled directly by traditional legal services staff lawyers, cases closed by LSC-funded programs
serving migrant and Native American communities, and cases handled by private attorneys paid
to represent LSC-eligible clients. Id. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. 1614, LSC-funded programs are
required to expend at least 12.5% of their LSC field-grant money to funding the delivery of legal
services through private attorneys who are paid a reduced rate to accept LSC-eligible clients. Id
at21 nn.13-14.
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Nationwide, the LSC Justice Gap Report found that "on the average, only
one legal aid attorney is available for every 6,415 low-income people ...
[compared to] one private attorney providing personal legal services .. . for
every 429 people in the general population." 57  Compounding the simple
arithmetic of LSC's inability to meaningfully close the justice gap is the legacy
of draconian and decidedly unfair restrictions on the ability of LSC lawyzers to
represent poor Americans eligible for assistance through LSC programs. The
57. LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. Somewhat ironically, however, members
of Congress have little difficulty retaining legal counsel because, unlike the poor, members of the
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate, as well as high level
executive-branch officials, have little difficulty raising large sums of money for legal defense
funds. See Robert Hornstein, Daniel G. Atkins & Treena A. Kaye, The Politics of Equal Justice,
II AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1089, 1091-103 (2003) (examining the history of the
Legal Services Corporation and pointing out how elected officials have used campaign money
and legal defense funds to pay for legal representation, including members of Congress who have
objected to using public money to provide legal assistance to the poor).
58. See Quigley, supra note 42, at 253-63 (explaining the compromises in the LSC bill
President Nixon signed, including restrictions prohibiting abortion litigation as well as litigation
involving school desegregation and selective service, and describing the restrictions that have
been placed on Legal Services during the years following its creation); see also Ilisabeth Smith
Bornstein, Comment, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the
Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693,
693 (examining the restriction on class action-litigation and arguing that it is unconstitutional
because it constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination); J. Dwight Yoder, Note, Justice or
Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal
Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 827 (1998) (examining the application of the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine to legislative restrictions on LSC and arguing that many of
the restrictions are constitutionally infirm). On December 16, 2009, President Obama signed an
appropriation bill into law that increased LSC's funding and lifted the long-standing statutory
restriction on the recovery and collection of attorneys' fees. Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. B, tit. IV, 123 Stat. 3034, 3148 (2009). In response to
Congress's lifting of this restriction, the LSC immediately suspended the enforcement of its
regulation that had implemented the statutory restriction. See LSC Updates, President Signs LSC
Funding Increase into Law (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.lsc.gov/press/updates 2009_detail
_T246_R28.php. Proposed legislation in both the House and the Senate, if enacted, would end a
number of the harshest remaining restrictions. A bill introduced in March 2009 by Iowa Senator
Tom Harkin, the Civil Access to Justice Act of 2009, would lift the ban on class actions and
permit LSC lawyers to bring class suits based on existing law. S. 718, 11 1th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009). It would also free nonfederal money received by LSC programs from federal restrictions
except in matters relating to abortion and the representation of prisoners in certain civil matters.
Id. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 2847, which had a provision lifting the restrictions
against recovery of attorney's fees, but left intact all other restrictions. H.R. 2847, 11 1th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009); see Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Timeline of FY 2010 Appropriations Process and
Efforts to Repeal Key LSC Restrictions, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
timelineof fy_2010_appropriations_process andefforts to repeal the Isc re/ (last visited
Aug. 11, 2009) (explaining the timeline and series of legislative steps taken to move the bills
along); see also Rhonda McMillion, Warming Trend" Congress Looks to Bolster the LSC as the
Recession Raises Legal Worries for the Poor, A.B.A. J., July 2009, at 66, 66; Editorial, A Fair
Shake for Legal Aid, WASH. POST, July 13, 2009, at A16; Editorial, Congress Must Lift
Restrictions on Legal Aid, BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 2009, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
opinion/editoriallbal-legalaidpreview0626,0,4374050.story; Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp.,
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fact that the problem has been known and documented as a conspicuous failure
of our civil justice system since the 1919 publication of Reginald Heber
Smith's revelatory study of how the poor fared in the nation's courts is a
sobering reminder that, for a substantial part of our national history, our
commitment to equal justice has been truer in word than in deed. 59 Heber
argued that "equal administration of justice must take cognizance of, and
provide for, a class of citizens, numbering millions, who cannot secure for
themselves the legal services without which the machinery of justice is
unworkable."
60
There can be no serious dispute that a person's inability to retain counsel
bears heavily, if not conclusivey, on the quality of justice he will receive in
the nation's civil courtrooms.' It is neither overwrought rhetoric nor
hyperbole to claim that there are two distinct types of justice available in the
civil courtrooms of the United States--one that is available to those Americans
able to afford counsel as well as those Americans who are fortunate enough to
receive representation through a legal services program or a private pro bono
lawyer, and another that is available to those Americans who must proceed on
their own without the guiding hand of counsel.6 2
Over five decades ago, in Griffin v. Illinois, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the question of whether an indigent criminal defendant who
could not afford a transcript of the trial to secure appellate review was denied
due process and equal protection when the state did not provide an effective63
means of appellate review. The Court in Griffin held that "[d]estitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who
have money enough to buy transcripts." 64 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the
House Approves $440 Million for LSC (June 18, 2009), http://www.lsc.gov/press/
pressreleasedetail_2009_T248_R15.php.
59. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 31-34 (Am. Bar Ctr. 1967) (1919)
(examining the impact poverty had on the quality of justice available to the poor and calling for
increased efforts to provide equal access to justice); see James D. Lorenz, Jr., Almost the Last
Word on Legal Services: Congress Can Do Pretty Much What It Likes, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 295, 300-01 (1998) (asking whether "equal access to the system of justice . . . mean[s]
access equal to the kind of representation [that] ... middle class American citizen[s] can afford..
. or . . . access equal to that enjoyed by big corporations and government agencies" (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
60. SMITH, supra note 59, at 33.
61. See LSC JUSTICE GAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 ("There is a growing body of
research indicating that outcomes for unrepresented litigants are often less favorable than those
for represented litigants.").
62. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (explaining that in a criminal case even
an educated and intelligent person "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him").
63. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-16 (1956).
64. Id. at 19. The Court stopped short of obligating every state to provide a transcript in
each case for indigent defendants. Id at 20. The Court left open other means to ensure an
indigent defendant has an adequate opportunity to secure appellate review. Id.
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majority, pointedly observed that "It]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."65 Although
Griffin was a criminal appeals case that involved a loss of physical liberty, and
is generally treated as an access to court fee-waiver decision, the Court's
reasoning in Griffin offers useful instruction in understanding why the right to
be heard through counsel in a civil case is a hollow ideal for the millions of
litigants unable to afford counsel.66
In the course of explaining the rationale for its decision in Griffin, the Court
proffered as a constitutional axiom that "[s]urely no one would contend that
•.. a [s]tate... could.., provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in
advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to defend themselves
in court."67 Finding that "[s]uch a law would make the constitutional promise
of a fair trial a worthless thing," Justice Black reasoned that if a state were to
condition the right to be heard on one's ability to pay court costs in advance,
"[n]otice, the right to be heard, and the right to counsel would . . . be
meaningless promises to the poor.' 68 No doubt, every American has a right to
be heard through counsel in virtually any type of civil proceeding. But how
much is this right worth for those who cannot afford to pay for counsel? Over
nine decades ago, Reginald Heber Smith eloquently explained why a person's
right to proceed on his own through the legal system held little meaning for the
poor:
[T]he procedural law, in accordance with which litigation must be
conducted, is a maze to the uninitiated; it is a science in itself. The
law permits every man to try his own case, but 'the lay vision of
every man his own lawyer has been shown by all experience to be an
illusion.' It is a virtual impossibility for a man to conduct even the
simplest sort of a case under the existing rules of procedure, and this
fact robs the in forma pauperis proceeding of much of its value to the
poor unless supplemented by the providing of counsel.
69
More so than ever before, successfully navigating the administrative rules,
statutes, judicial decisions, and layers of procedural rules that can apply in any
given case, including the simplest of cases, is an increasingly challenging and
costly task for experienced lawyers.70 It is difficult to imagine how a poor
litigant would fare, for example, in the discovery process when it involves
65. Id. at 19.
66. See id. at 18-19.
67. Id. at 17.
68. Id.
69. SMITH, supra note 59, at 31-32 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
70. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous.
L. REV. 309, 324 (2004) ("As the practice of law has become more complex and technology has
increased the speed at which law is practiced, it has become both easier and harder for solo and
small firm practitioners to keep up with changes in the law and to perform their work in a
competent fashion.").
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complicated electronic-discovery issues.7 ' In fact, the burden of effective self-
representation in the nation's civil courtrooms, as a practical matter, is nearly
impossible for most poor Americans. 72  Consider, as an illustration, the
71. See Maureen N. Armour, Federal Courts as Constitutional Laboratories: The Rat's
Point of View, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 135, 226 (2008) (explaining how the conscious use ofjudicial
discretion by lower federal courts shapes the outcome in cases involving the problematic Supreme
Court precedent and how this permits lower federal courts to serve as a type of laboratory
incorporating fact finding as a facet of its adjudicatory function, which allows it to make doctrinal
adjustments, but also noting that "this aspect of the laboratory [role] works best when lawyers are
involved . .. [because] fact development, legal briefing, complex discovery, and difficult trials
are time-consuming activities and involve technical skills beyond most pro se litigants"); Kristen
McNeal, Note, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.: 9,259,985 Reasons to Comply with Discovery
Requests, RICH. J.L. & TECH, Spring 2009, at 1, 16 ("[E]ver-evolving technological advances
could further complicate the known difficulties involved when conducting extensive electronic
discovery throughout complex litigation [and] [t]o avoid sanctions, attorneys and corporations
need to know how to efficiently manage electronic discovery."); see also John T. Broderick, Jr. &
Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A19
(discussing arguments of California and New Hampshire Supreme Courts for all states to adopt
limited scope of representation rules because of the increasing number of litigants who cannot
afford counsel and must proceed pro se).
72. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges and the Pro Se
Plaintiff 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 475, 483 (2002) ("[T]he legally untrained
face special difficulties in navigating and carrying out the arcane requirements of pleading and
• . . [p]ro se claims can implicate abstruse and complex statutes, yet pro se litigants lack the
resources, financial and other, to interpret the governing law or to marshal evidentiary and expert
support for their claims."); Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited
Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se
Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 564 (2007) ("[A]side from the disadvantage they face
due to lack of legal knowledge and experience, pro se litigants are vulnerable to unethical
opposing counsel, are less successful in asserting defenses and presenting evidence, and generally
face poorer legal outcomes."). The problem of self-representation is compounded because many
jurisdictions hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys. See, e.g., Spurlock v.
Demby, No. 92-3842, 1995 WL 89003 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 1995) (holding pro se plaintiffs in a
§ 1983 action to the same requirements provided in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as attorneys, and upholding the district court's granting of the defendant's motion for
sanctions in the form of attorney's fees); Harris v. Boyd G. Montgomery Testamentary Trust, 262
S.W.3d 145, 146-47 (Ark. 2007) (per curium) (denying a motion for belated brief because of a
pro se litigant's failure to timely file the order of the court, the record, and the brief because "pro
se appellants receive no special consideration of their argument and are held to the same standard
as licensed attorneys"); Watkins v. Peacock, 184 P.3d 210, 212, 215 (Idaho 2008) (holding the
pro se appellant and servient-estate owner to the same standards as parties represented by
attorneys in litigation concerning blockage of implied easement); Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E. 2d
553, 554-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, 130 S.
Ct. 800 (2009) (holding the pro se plaintiff to the same standards as attorneys and dismissing the
plaintiffs civil rights claim against the Department of Corrections as frivolous for procedural
defects in stating the claim); Rainey v. SSPS Inc., 259 S.W.3d 603, 604-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding the pro se appellant to the same standards under procedural rules as attorneys and
denying relief to the appellant who sought unemployment compensation for failing to meet
procedural requirements for contents of appellate briefs); Mayo v. Suemaur Exploration & Prod.
LLC, No. 14-07-00491-CV, 2008 WL 4355259 (Tex. App. Aug. 26, 2008) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of the appellee where the pro se appellant's documents filed as attachments to
the response to the appellee's motion for summary judgment were unauthenticated, where the
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likelihood in a foreclosure case that an impoverished homeowner would be
able to locate cases or federal and state statutes and regulations that might
provide a defense to the lawsuit.73 For this reason, the right to be heard, which
is available to all who enter our civil courts, is little more than an illusory right
unless a person can afford private counsel, is eligible for representation
through a legal aid or legal services program, or is the beneficiary of pro bono
representation by a member of the private bar.
II. WHY BAD FACTS SHOULD HAVE MADE GOOD LAW: REVISITING THE
LASSITER DECISION THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE UNDESERVING POOR
Justice Stewart begins his opinion in Lassiter with facts that detail Ms.
Lassiter's failings as a parent, including the original allegations that caused the
Durham County Department of Social Services (Department of Social
Services) to remove William, her infant son, from her custody. 74 These facts
include the circumstances in the spring 1975 when her son was first removed
because she had been accused of neglecting to provide him with proper
medical care.75 Next, Justice Stewart explains that, following the child's
removal, which was authorized by a North Carolina state court that found
William to be a neglected child, Ms. Lassiter and her mother, Lucille, were
charged with first-degree murder of a neighbor.7 6 The latter incident occurred
during a fight that started between the neighbor and Lassiter's mother and
eventually involved Ms. Lassiter herself.77  The altercation ended with the
appellant did not move for opportunity to cure or for continuance upon the appellee's objection to
the unauthenticated evidence, and where failing to hold the pro se litigants to same procedural
rules as licensed attorneys would be unfair to represented parties).
73. See MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 2 (2009) (examining the sub-prime
mortgage crisis and explaining how the poor's lack of access to counsel prevents them from
raising meritorious defenses and how legal representation could prevent foreclosure and loss).
74. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20-24 (1981).
75. Id. at 20. Professor Lowell F. Schechter and Professor Elizabeth G. Thornburg have
each written powerful and poignant narratives on the Lassiter decision. Professor Schechter's
1981 article, The Pitfalls of Timidity: The Ramifications of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services, carefully traces the history of the events in Lassiter, provides a rich source of
information about both the case and Ms. Lassiter, and offers a forceful rebuttal of Justice
Stewart's treatment of Ms. Lassiter's constitutional claim. See Schechter, supra note 30, at 435-
37. Professor Thornburg's accounting of the Lassiter decision also provides an insightful and
in-depth analysis of the case's events and personalities involved, and is an eloquent statement
about the vital importance of legal counsel to procedural fairness. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 489, 522-26 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
76. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20 & n. ; Thornburg, supra note 75, at 498.
77. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20 n.1 ; Thornburg, supra note 75, at 498-99.
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stabbing death of the neighbor. 78 Although the charge against her mother was
dropped on a motion for a nonsuit, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-
79degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five-to-forty-years in prison.
After giving a summary account of the circumstances surrounding the initial
removal of the child and Ms. Lassiter's criminal conviction for second-degree
murder, Justice Stewart recounted that three years later, while she was serving
her prison sentence, the Department of Social Services initiated proceedings to
terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights on the basis that she had
willfully left the child in foster care for more than two
consecutive years without showing that substantial progress has been
made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the
78. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20 n.I. Justice Stewart's citation to facts contained in the North
Carolina appellate decision reviewing Ms. Lassiter's criminal conviction was sharply criticized
by one of Justice Blackmun's law clerks. Blackmun's law clerk accused Justice Stewart of going
outside the record in Lassiter to obtain the unpublished North Carolina appellate opinion. See
Letter from JJB to Mr. Justice Blackmun (May 8, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
According to the law clerk, "[c]ontrary to the implication in the Court's footnote, the murder
appeal [was] not officially reported. Plotter ]S[tewart] must have sent away to North Carolina for
the per curium . . . and there is no indication anywhere in the record that this judge had
knowledge of those events." Id. Justice Stewart's reference to the unpublished North Carolina
decision and facts relating to Ms. Lassiter's criminal case appear in the first footnote of his
opinion in Lassiter. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20. Justice Blackmun's law clerk had included an
admonition against Justice Stewart in a footnote of a draft of Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion, but Justice Blackmun deleted the footnote. Letter from JJB to Mr. Justice Blackmun
(May 8, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31. After the charge had been removed from
Justice Blackmun's draft dissenting-opinion, the law clerk inquired if Justice Blackmun was
certain about the revision, explaining, "I defer to your judgment here, but I do feel that P[otter]
S[tewart] acted in a highly inappropriate fashion by taking judicial notice of facts never
considered below." Id.
79. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21 n.l. Professor Thornburg, relying on materials from Ms.
Lassiter's post-conviction challenge to her criminal conviction and on interviews with Frank
Bullock, the lawyer appointed to represent her at the murder trial, offers a narrative of the crime
and the circumstances of Ms. Lassiter's legal representation during the trial that suggests that Ms.
Lassiter may, in fact, have been innocent and received neither a fair trial nor effective
representation. Thomburg, supra note 75, at 497 n.33, 499-501. Professor Thornburg's narrative
centers on evidence showing that Lucille Lassiter may have been responsible for stabbing the
neighbor. Id. at 499-501. Professor Thomburg details how the prosecution had an oral statement
that Lucille gave to a police officer in which she stated that it was she, not Abby Gail Lassiter,
who stabbed the neighbor. Id. at 499-500. However, this evidence, which was inculpatory of
Lucille but exculpatory of Ms. Lassiter, was not timely disclosed to either Lucille's lawyer or Ms.
Lassiter's lawyer. Id. at 500. A mistrial was declared and ultimately the state decided to forego
using the statement, at which point Lucille's lawyer successfully secured a dismissal of the
charges against her. Id. Ms. Lassiter's case went forward, but her lawyer elected not to use the
statement or make a claim of constitutional error based on the failure of the state to disclose the
statement before the trial. Id. at 500-01. In addition to the state's failure to disclose Lucille's
oral statement, Lassiter's appointed lawyer had limited experience, having only graduated from
law school in 1973, eight years before the Supreme Court's final decision was issued. Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 18; Thomburg, supra note 75, at 498. These circumstances surrounding the criminal
proceeding offer an alternative narrative of Lassiter's status as a convicted murderer-one that
raises the possibility that she was innocent.
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child, or without showing a positive response to the diligent efforts
of the Department... to strengthen her relationship to the child, or to
make and follow through with constructive planning for the future of
the child.8"
Having established her criminal conviction, imprisonment, and the initiation
of parental-termination proceedings, Justice Stewart next explained that Ms.
Lassiter was given proper notice of the termination proceedings but that she
failed to notify an attorney handling her post-conviction collateral criminal
proceeding about the termination petition filed by the Department of Social
Services. In fact, Justice Stewart places special emphasis on the fact that Ms.
Lassiter did not share this information with "any other person except with" a
never-identified person who Ms. Lassiter had described in her testimony at the
hearing only as "someone" in prison.82 The transcript of the termination
hearing, however, reveals that Ms. Lassiter attempted to get assistance. 83 At
the outset of the hearing when the trial judge explored whether she had
sufficient time to retain counsel, he inquired into what Ms. Lassiter did when
she was served with the petition for termination:
THE COURT: And she has had over four months to speak to an
attorney and has spoken to an attorney but has not consulted anyone
with reference to this child. Isn't that true?
LASSITER: Say what now?
THE COURT: I said you were served with notice of-I mean, you
were served with a summons in reference to the termination of your
parental rights of William L. Lassiter on April 12.
LASSITER: Yes, I got the papers.
THE COURT: And you have done nothing towards -
LASSITER: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: What did you do?
LASSITER: I reported to the Department of Corrections Center. 1
told someone about that. Didn't nobody get in touch with no one and
I told them I had a paper when I got the first paper. I contacted
someone and told them I had to go to Court about this paper and
didn't nobody contact no one and I told one of the matrons there.
84
This colloquy belies Justice Stewart's harsh judgment of Ms. Lassiter's
efforts to share the information and to notify someone about the termination
proceeding. Any assessment of the efficacy of her efforts to obtain assistance,
however, must be measured against the substantial obstacles created by her
80. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Thornburg, supra note 75, at 502 n.45.
84. Transcript of Evidence at 3-4, In re Lassiter, No. 75J56 (N.C. Dist. Ct. 1978).
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incarceration as well as by her limitations, which likely included some degree
of mental retardation. 85 Professor Lowell F. Schechter, in his 1981 article
examining a number of important facts that were missing from the Court's
understanding of Ms. Lassiter,86 points to information suggesting that Ms.
Lassiter might have been either mentally retarded or, at minimum, of very low
intelligence. 87 The Court's accounting of her actions, though, never considered
the possibility that she was impeded by her status as an inmate, by ignorance,
by limited education, or by other circumstances such as mental retardation.
By any measure, Justice Stewart's factual portrait of Ms. Lassiter is not
flattering. It presents an almost perfect-pitch caricature of an undeserving poor
person unwilling to meet the responsibilities of life and her parental
responsibilities to her child and undeserving of representation. Historian
Michael Katz, who has written extensively on the history of social welfare and
poverty in the United States, explains that "the language of poverty is a
vocabulary of invidious distinction."8 9  According to Katz, "[b]y mistaking
socially constructed categories for natural distinctions, we reinforce inequality
and stigmatize even those we set out to help.' 90 Katz documents how the
increase in the number of poor, unwed black women receiving welfare informs
our modern understanding of the undeserving poor.91  Noted sociologist
85. Schechter, supra note 30, at 437-55. The matter of Lassiter's possible mental
retardation was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court in her petition for rehearing.
Lassiter's attorneys argued her possible mental retardation was "[p]erhaps the most compelling
reason appointed counsel" was necessary. Petition for Rehearing at 9, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 453 U.S. 927 (1981) (No. 79-6423). Lassiter's lawyers further argued that evidence of her
possible retardation was before the Court through evidence that, admittedly, constituted hearsay,
but which was nonetheless "relied upon extensively in marshalling the case against her." Id. at 10
n.3.
86. Schechter, supra note 30, at 437-55.
87. Id. at 446.
88. See KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR, supra note 29, at 11-16.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 6. In a recent essay, "Losers " and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, Professor
Andrew R. Cline examines how the media's use of the label "[l]oser has begun to shift ... from a
largely sympathetic term for victims of the 2008-2009 recession, to a derogatory label for people
who benefit from government largess at the expense of Americans more charitably described as
'honest' and 'hardworking."' Andrew R. Cline, "Losers" and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis,
POVERTY & PUB. POL'Y, 2009, at 1, 1 (2009). Cline goes on to discuss how this rhetorical shift
occurred by examining the narratives employed by print and television pundits like George Will,
Rush Limbaugh, Rick Santelli, Larry Kudlow, and Ann Coulter. Id. at 3-8. Professor Cline
explains how these media pundits' narratives of the crisis included both veiled and naked
references to race, undeservingness, and productivity, as well as narratives that linked
government aid to effected sub-prime borrowers to welfare and immorality. Id.
91. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR, supra note 29, at 68-69; see Kenneth L. Karst, The
Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 543 n. 103 (1997)
("Anglo-American law has always treated relief for the poor as a means of controlling 'deviance,'
distinguishing between the 'deserving' poor, who need not work in order to receive support, and
the 'undeserving' poor, who must be forced to work."); Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking
"Welfare Dependency "from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1961 n.2 (1993) (explaining
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Herbert Gans explored what he called the "ideology of undeservingness" in his
influential book, The War Against the Poor. Gans argues under this
ideology:
If poor people do not behave according to the rules set by
mainstream America, they must be undeserving. They are
undeserving because they believe in and therefore practice bad
values, suggesting that they do not want to be part of mainstream
America culturally or socially. As a result of bad values and
practices, undeservingness has become a major cause of
contemporary poverty. If poor people gave up these values, their
poverty would decline automatically, and mainstream Americans
would be ready to help them, as they help other, "deserving" poor
people.
93
The concept of the undeserving poor is one that can be traced back to the era
of the Elizabethan Statute of Laborers and the conception of public assistance
in English history.94 It has been a continuing theme that has informed modem
welfare-policy, from the era of the Freedman's Bureau following the Civil War
to the debate over welfare reform during the 1990s.
95
that the push for welfare was focused on the programs that served those persons who were
"traditionally categorized as the 'undeserving' poor"); Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and
the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means Tested Welfare
Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 663, 668-69, 676, 684 (2005) (explaining how, under
the social work model of AFDC, home visits by social workers and welfare case workers were
used to both stigmatize welfare recipients and distinguish between the deserving and the
undeserving poor).
92. GANS, supra note 29, at 6.
93. Id. Gans explains that the term "undeserving poor" has been used as a behavioral term
"to describe poor people who are accused, rightly or wrongly, of failing to behave in the
'mainstream' ways of the ... dominant American middle class." Id. at 2. Gans argues that the
behaviors of the poor, which are deemed to be the result of moral deficiencies, are usually
"poverty related effects." Id. He argues further "that sometimes poor people are driven by the
effects of poverty to actions that violate their own morals and values." Id.
94. See William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834:
Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73-75 (1996) (surveying
English welfare law).
95. See Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking
Back Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief 44 CASE. W. RES. L. REv.
871, 907-08 (1995) (arguing that American welfare policy makers circumvent having to address
poverty in a meaningful way by labeling some of the poor as undeserving); Dorothy A. Brown,
Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 811, 813-14 (2007) (explaining
how the concept of the undeserving poor and welfare policy has been informed by racial imagery,
and how the "distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor" had an impact on the
decision to extend the Freedman's Bureau for an additional two years); Joel F. Handler,
"Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and
Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 913 (1990) (explaining how,
even prior to the New Deal, African Americans were considered "the most undeserving of the
undeserving," and how New Deal legislation discriminated between the deserving and the
undeserving poor); Richard Hardack, Bad Faith: Race, Religion and the Reformation of Welfare
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And so it was for Ms. Lassiter in her quest for a greater measure of justice
before the Supreme Court. Justice Stewart's unsympathetic depiction of Ms.
Lassiter as a member of the undeserving poor served a purpose beyond mere
biography. Portraying her in this way contextualized and subtly mitigated the
obvious disadvantages she faced over twenty-five years ago in that North
Carolina courtroom-as a convicted murderer who also carried the burden and
stigma of being poor, black, and the unwed mother of five children. 96 Equally
important, it assisted the Court in finding that the termination of her parental
rights was, quite simply, not fundamentally unfair in a constitutional sense or,
for that matter, at odds with any normative sense of justice.9
7
Although Ms. Lassiter's principal brief before the Supreme Court raised her
poverty as a factor militating in favor of the need for appointment of counsel to
avoid an erroneous decision, it did so only indirectly by quoting Gideon v.
Wainwright, referring to her as poor in a footnote, and citing academic works
that support "the fact that most parents who are the subjects of termination
proceedings are . . . poor and lacking in formal education." 98  The brief,
however, did not examine how her particular circumstances as a poor person
constrained her ability to represent herself.99 Ms. Lassiter's brief also raised
the issue of race by discussing the vitally important role of the extended family
in the African American community as an alternative foster-care structure to
provide for the well-being of children born out of wedlock. 00 Ms. Lassiter's
lawyers argued that "[i]f counsel had been appointed . . . it is reasonable to
expect that this important issue would have been clearly presented to the court
as a discrete legal issue."' 01 But it is fair to say that Ms. Lassiter's lawyers
stayed as far as possible from the details of her life.
10 2
Ms. Lassiter's status as an undeserving poor person, however, is
nevertheless deeply woven into Justice Stewart's constitutional narrative,
10 3
Law, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 539, 627 (2006) ("Recent welfare reforms continue
to target these unworthy, 'undeserving poor,' those whose personal behavior does not conform to
putative middle-class norms .... "); Frank Munger, How Can We Save the Safety Net?, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 543, 547-53 (2004) (explaining how welfare reform is informed by moral
distinctions and the claim that welfare unfairly rewards idleness); Vincent D. Rougeau, A Crisis
of Caring: A Catholic Critique of American Welfare Reform, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 101,
102 (2003) ("[C]urrent American reforms of economic assistance for the poor are creatures of a
political rendering of poverty that fails to take seriously the low regard in which many Americans
hold the poor.").
96. Thornburg, supra note 75, at 518-21; Schechter, supra note 30 at 437-43.
97. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20-23, 33 (1981).
98. Brief for the Petitioner at 27-28 & n.24, Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (No. 79-6423), 1980 WL
340033.
99. See generally id.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Id. at42.
102. See generally id.
103. See, e.g., Bridgette Baldwin, in Supreme Judgment of the Poor: The Role of the United
States Supreme Court in Welfare Law and Policy, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 1, 39 (2008)
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though not in so many words. The influence that Ms. Lassiter's status as a
member of the undeserving poor had on the Court is evident in how Justice
Stewart used the record to determine whether Ms. Lassiter was deserving of
better constitutional treatment:
While hearsay evidence was no doubt admitted, and while Ms.
Lassiter no doubt left incomplete her defense that the Department
had not adequately assisted her in rekindling her interest in her son,
the weight of the evidence that she had few sparks of such an interest
was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter
could not have made a determinative difference .... Finally, a court
deciding whether due process requires the appointment of counsel
need not ignore a parent's plain demonstration that she is not
interested in attending a hearing. Here, the trial court had previously
found that Ms. Lassiter had expressly declined to appear at the 1975
child custody hearing.
10 4
This narrative rests on the Department of Social Services' account of the
case's history and its characterization of Ms. Lassiter's conduct, which the
North Carolina state trial judge embraced. 105 In a very real sense both her need
and her constitutional claim to representation were displaced by the majority's
moral judgments about her. Justice Blackmun, who authored an impassioned
dissent, ceded to the majority that Ms. Lassiter "plainly has not led the life of
("Critical race scholars have long shown . . . the Justices' beliefs about responsibility and
deservedness heavily inform their decisions about the spirit of the law."); Linda S. Green, From
Brown To Grutter, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13-14 (2004) (explaining in the context of equal
protection under the rules of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), and McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987), how "constitutional doctrine immunizes from judicial inquiry
the cumulative effects of private and public decision-making, as well as the influence of wealth
and poverty"); Martin Guggenheim, How Children 's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J.
805, 829 (2006) (arguing that the concept of the undeserving poor is a factor in "influenc[ing] the
public into believing that children in foster care come from undeserving homes is to over-label
their parents as abusers"); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1499 (1991) (arguing that a rhetoric of poverty runs through
Supreme Court opinions that suggest the poor are "unwilling to work and especially likely to
commit fraud or child abuse, or to violate other legal and moral norms [and] . . . have bad
attitudes and are the cause of their own poverty"); see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform, " Family, and Criminal Law, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 688, 702 (1998) ("For many poor women, single mothers, and women of color,
the battle to retain custody of their children is often not with the children's father, but with the
state .... An understanding of the historical and cultural context in which courts hear child
protection cases is critical to an analysis of the ways that judges respond to the mothers who
appear before them."); Symposium, Access to Justice: Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 455, 481 (2004) (documenting long-time access-to-justice advocate Esther
Lardent's explanation that one obstacle pro bono efforts faced in providing equal access to justice
for the poor is the perception that "these people are just defective or lazy").
104. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (emphasis added).
105. See Brief for the Respondent at 2-3, Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (No. 79-6423), 1980 WL
340034.
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the exemplary citizen or model parent," but, nevertheless, he did not permit her
fractured life to diminish or dilute her need for legal representation 06 Justice
Blackmun understood that "the issue before the Court [was] not [Lassiter's]
character, [but] whether she was given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard." 0 7 It was because of her fractured life and her marginalized existence
that she needed the assistance of counsel to obtain a fair hearing.
The conference notes of both Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell reveal
that, although none of the justices raised Ms. Lassiter's deservedness as an
explicit decisional factor during their conference deliberations, the issue
obliquely made its way into the decision-making process. 10 8  During
conference discussion of the case, several of the justices expressed the opinion
that the case presented bad facts and that it had been correctly decided on the
merits. 10 9  Both Justice Powell's and Justice Blackmun's conference notes
indicate that even Justice Marshall, who joined Justice Blackmun's dissent,
believed the case presented bad facts. 1 ° Like Justice Brennan and Justice
Blackmun, however, Justice Marshall thought the constitution required
appointment of counsel for Ms. Lassiter."'
Justice Blackmun's conference notes suggest that Chief Justice Burger's
view of the case was driven in part by what he considered bad facts.'
12
According to Justice Blackmun's notes, Chief Justice Burger's preference was
to dispose of the case on the ground that certiorari had been improvidently
granted."13 More specifically, Chief Justice Burger thought it was a "bad case
to open the counsel door." 114 Ultimately, Chief Justice Burger concurred and
106. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31; Conference Notes of Justice Louis F.
Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (198 1), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
109. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31; Conference Notes of Justice Louis F.
Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
110. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31; Conference Notes of Justice Louis F.
Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
11. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); cf Bruce A. Green & Daniel
Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall's View of Criminal Procedure, 26
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 384 (1994) (explaining that, in the context of criminal procedure, "it was
important to Justice Marshall as a jurisprudential matter to reject the idea that constitutional
provisions should be read through the prism of any individual Justice's experience [and that
Marshall believed that it] would [not] move society in a positive direction for the Court to issue
rulings based on an assumption that the poor and minorities are ignorant of their rights").
112. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
113. Id. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion makes note of this position. Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 34 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
114. Id.
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indicated in his opinion that he thought the case should have been dismissed on
the ground that review had been improvidently granted.1 15 Justice Powell's
conference notes indicate that Justice White believed that, "on [the] facts of
this case-if we reached them-the case was rightly decided.""' Implicit,
however, in these notes, which reflect the justices' views of the facts and the
merits of the North Carolina trial court's ruling, is the belief that Ms. Lassiter
was not deserving of the constitutional protections to which she claimed
entitlement.
Ms. Lassiter's need for counsel was subordinated to the Court's assessment
of her perceived worthiness to receive and benefit from a constitutional right to
counsel." 7 But if not Ms. Lassiter, then who might demonstrate a greater need
for the protection and advice of legal counsel? The available evidence
suggests that, although she was able to deny the allegations leveled against her
in a rudimentary way, she lacked the communicative ability and the depth of
understanding needed to present an effective defense. 118 Certainly, if she was
cognitively impaired by a type of mental retardation, her inability to effectively
communicate would no doubt have affected her ability to defend her interests
as well as take the steps necessary to seek out counsel. On rehearing,
Lassiter's lawyers pointed out that "[a] case summary located in the Juvenile
Court files indicate[d] that [Lassiter] appeared '... to have a retardation
factor."' 1l9
The Court's discomfort with Ms. Lassiter's deservedness was evident in how
the Court assigned her personal responsibility for failing to ask for counsel or
inform the trial court that she was indigent. 12  The Department of Social
Services argued in its brief that Ms. Lassiter failed to raise the matter of her
right to appointed counsel in the trial court.121 Specifically, the North Carolina
agency maintained that "[t]here is nothing in the record before the Court to
indicate that this question was before the Trial Court[, and s]he never asked
11122that [the court] appoint a lawyer for her .... ,2 The Department of Social
Services also argued that Ms. Lassiter never offered evidence of her indigency
in the trial court. 23 For these reasons, the Department of Social Services
115. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
116. Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423
(1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
117. See Thomburg, supra note 75, at 520 ("In many subtle ways Abby Gail's gender in fact
affected the Court's analysis. . . . In the majority's view Abby Gail was a woman of loose
morals, a bad mother, a murderer .....
118. See Lassiter, 452 at 23, 33.
119. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 85, at 10 (alteration in original).
120. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
121. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 10.
122. Id at 8-9.
123. Id. at 9.
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maintained that Ms. Lassiter's due process claim had not been properly
preserved for review. 
124
Whether Ms. Lassiter's failure to inform the trial judge that she was indigent
and to ask for counsel constituted a waiver of her right to counsel was an issue
that concerned some of the justices, yet none understood it in the context of her
poverty. 125 Justice Stewart did not formally address the waiver issue, and only
implicitly addressed it through his carefully arranged presentation of the facts
that repeatedly emphasized Ms. Lassiter's failure to act responsibly and protect
her rights. 126 Her failure to ask the trial court to appoint her counsel was
another indicia of her undeservingness. This informed Justice Stewart's
conclusion that "Ms. Lassiter did not aver that she was indigent, and
[therefore] the court did not appoint counsel for her."' 127  The way Justice
Stewart used the matter of Ms. Lassiter's possible waiver was in some measure
a kind of judicial patois for her lack of personal responsibility.128
Justice Stewart also invested considerable effort in establishing that Ms.
Lassiter's appearance at the termination hearing was actually "(a]t the behest
of the Department of Social Services' attorney" and that the trial judge began
the proceeding with an inquiry into "whether Ms. Lassiter should have more
time in which to find legal assistance."' 129 This may have been the first time
Ms. Lassiter was fully aware of or understood the fact that she could be
represented, but this possibility went unaddressed by Justice Stewart. Justice
124. Id. at 10.
125. Interestingly, the law clerks for Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell noted Ms.
Lassiter's status as a poor person and treated it more sympathetically than the Court's formal
opinion. In a bench memo written for Justice Powell a few days before the February 23, 1981
oral argument, one of his law clerks, who had recommended reversal of the North Carolina
judgment, pointed out that "[p]eople whose parental rights are likely to be terminated are the poor
and minorities who are least likely to persuade a court, in light of the contrary position of
professional social workers, that they are proper parents." Bench Memorandum from Peter
Byrne, Law Clerk, to Mr. Justice Powell 5 (Feb. 20, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31. A
clerk for Justice Blackmun argued, "The trial transcript of this case provides eloquent testimony
to the inability of uneducated litigants to function adequately without counsel at a termination
hearing. It also suggests that without the credibility provided by professional representation, an
indigent and inartful parent is a likely victim of impatience or bias from the court." Bench
Memorandum to Mr. Justice Blackmun 24 (Feb. 6, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31,
box 341, folder 1. Justice Marshall's law clerk wrote, "the case provides an ideal opportunity to
vindicate rights of poor people, who are able to provide care for their children through extended
family networks, but who are nearly powerless in the face of the bureaucracy and the courts."
Bench Memorandum to Mr. Justice Marshall 6 (Feb. 23, 1981), in Papers of Justice Thurgood
Marshall (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 261, folder 2).
126. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 22 (1981).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Concededly, Justice Stewart does not explicitly confront the question of waiver.
Instead, he introduces the principle through facts to show that Ms. Lassiter never raised the matter
of her need for counsel. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33 ("In view of all these circumstances, we
hold that the trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel for Ms. Lassiter.").
129. Id.at2l.
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Stewart also had little interest in determining whether the state trial judge
adequately inquired of Ms. Lassiter whether she was able to retain counsel. 1
3
What Justice Stewart did focus on, however, was Ms. Lassiter's failure to
inform the private lawyer handling the post-conviction challenge of her
criminal case. 13 1  To Justice Stewart, her failure to do so was another
constitutionally damning fact.
It appears that Justice Brennan saw waiver as a minimal concern but not one
weighty enough to avoid deciding the case in her favor.132 But under either
scenario-waiver or the merits of the trial court's ruling-the same facts that
were considered bad by a number of the justices should have militated
decisively in favor of finding that due process required appointment of
counsel. It was precisely because of her status as a convicted inmate, who had
neither the understanding nor the ability to tender a defense on her own behalf,
that Ms. Lassiter needed legal representation to receive a fair hearing.
33
Justice Stewart's treatment of the waiver question, however, absolved the trial
court of any duty or responsibility and cast Ms. Lassiter as someone who did
not deserve greater constitutional protections. 1
34
At the termination hearing the trial judge should have had no doubt about
Ms. Lassiter's indigency because, at the initial neglect proceeding in 1975, he
found that her welfare checks were being mailed to her boyfriend's house.'
35
Given that, in the past, Ms. Lassiter had received Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare benefits and that she was before the
Court as an inmate, her indigency should have been a matter of primary
concern for the trial court. The Department of Social Services' argument in
the Supreme Court that there was nothing in the record on the matter of her
indigency was, at best, disingenuous. 136  Indeed, the Department of Social
Services framed this issue in terms of Ms. Lassiter's failure to demonstrate her
indigency.137  Given that Ms. Lassiter had been subject to the agency's
oversight since her child was removed for neglect, it is virtually certain that her
130. Seeidat20-21.
131. Id. at 21; see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Beyond the Pronoun: Toward an Anti-Subordinating
Method of Process, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 3-4 (2000) (arguing that our procedural "rules
articulate a paradigm that does not correspond to the experience of many people in our society-
people who fall outside the mainstream because of their gender, race, level of income, or some
combination of these characteristics," and pointing out that poor women frequently lose in court
"because decision-makers do not understand the plight of the poor women who appear before
them and, far too often, because the decision-maker is prejudiced against them").
132. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
133. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33-34 ("Informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an
indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel.").
134. Id. at 32-33.
135. Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84, at 17; see Schechter, supra note 30, at 450.
136. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 8-9.
137. Id.
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case file would have contained information on her income sources and
employment history. Ironically, however, the lawyer for the state agency
questioned Ms. Lassiter on why her welfare check was sent to her boyfriend's
grandparents' home. 138 The state agency's lawyer then referenced evidence
from the 1975 neglect hearing that showed Lassiter was not living at that
address. 139
This fact evidencing her status as an impoverished person, who had
previously received AFDC, escaped the attention of Justice Stewart when he
assigned her blame for not informing the trial court that she was indigent and
not asking the court to appoint her counsel. 14  The Court's lack of interest in
understanding why she may not have acted on her own behalf, beyond the
prejudicial construct that she was irresponsible and undeserving, is given
greater context by her possible mental retardation. 14 1 If she, in fact, suffered
from a mental deficiency, her silence about her indigency and her
accompanying failure to ask for appointed counsel would not be the result of
irresponsibility or disaffection, but rather the result of her social isolation and
limited abilities. 142
The Supreme Court's response to the question of waiver in Johnson v.
Zerbst, a case about the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in federal criminal
felony proceedings, 143 offers a useful analogue to understand the reason Justice
Stewart's treatment of Ms. Lassiter's failure to ask the trial court for counsel
was constitutionally insufficient. The Court in Zerbst held that an indigent
defendant in a federal felony prosecution has the right to appointed counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, absent an intentional waiver. In Zerbst, two
enlisted Marines were arrested in Charleston, South Carolina, and charged with
passing four counterfeit twenty-dollar bills.1 45  The two defendants were
initially represented by counsel in a preliminary proceeding, but, after being
indicted by a grand jury two months later, they were unable to retain private
counsel. 146 At their arraignment, the two defendants informed the trial judge
they were not represented, and, after an inqui 7 by the Court, the defendants
stated that they were ready to proceed to trial.
14
138. Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84, at 18-19.
139. Id.
140. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1981).
141. Schechter, supra note 30, at 446.
142. Id. at 446-47. Ms. Lassiter's lawyers raised this evidence in her brief seeking rehearing.
Petition for Rehearing, supra note 85, at 9-10.
143. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), overruled in part, Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
144. Id. at 467-68.
145. Id. at 459-60.
146. Id. at 460.
147. Id.
20101 1083
Catholic University Law Review
The defendants in Zerbst, like Ms. Lassiter, had little education and could
not afford private counsel. 148 Unlike Ms. Lassiter, these two defendants were
far from home with no friends or family nearby. 149 And, of course, unlike Ms.
Lassiter, their physical liberty was at stake. 150 In Zerbst, the evidence showed
that the two defendants, similar to Ms. Lassiter, never asked the court to
appoint counsel. 15  The evidence adduced at the habeas proceeding also
showed that they asked the prosecutor to find counsel for them, but the
prosecutor denied this.152 After their trial, they returned to jail, and at that
point asked a guard to contact a lawyer for them. 153
Although the issue of waiver in Zerbst was examined in the context of the
Sixth Amendment's command that an accused shall have the assistance of
counsel, the Court's analysis nevertheless is helpful in understanding why
Justice Stewart's treatment of Ms. Lassiter's failure to ask for counsel was
constitutionally short-sighted. The Court in Zerbst identified a "protecting
duty" that "imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge
of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver."
154
In Lassiter, Justice Stewart used Ms. Lassiter's failure to request
appointment of counsel to help establish the fairness of the proceedings and to
exonerate the trial judge from any default in his judicial duty.155 After all, why
should the North Carolina trial judge be held responsible when Ms. Lassiter
never acted to inform her? Zerbst provides the answer. First, Justice Stewart
pointed to the trial court's finding that Lassiter "had ample opportunity to seek
and obtain counsel prior to the hearing." 156 Second, he devalued Ms. Lassiter's
testimony that she attempted to notify someone for assistance when she was
served with the termination petition. Given that Justice Stewart attached
148. Id
149. Id.
150. See id at 465.
151. Id. at460.
152. Id. at460-6 1.
153. Id. at461.
154. Id. at 465.
155. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 22 (1981) ("Since the court concluded
that she 'has had ample opportunity to seek and obtain counsel prior to the hearing of this matter,
and [that] her failure to do so is without just cause,' the court did not postpone the proceedings.").
156. Id. The hearing record reveals that the trial judge, after noting Ms. Lassiter had been
served and had done nothing to prepare for the hearing, pointed out the case had been set for
hearing once before, thereby suggesting she had ample opportunity to retain counsel. Transcript
of Evidence, supra note 84, at 3. However, it turned out the first hearing was cancelled because
the judge was out of town at a judicial conference. Id. at 6-7, In re Lassiter, No. 75J56 (N.C.
Dist. Ct. 1978). After it was revealed that the first hearing never took place, the lawyer for the
state agency noted that, if the court wanted to allow Ms. Lassiter more time to talk with the
lawyer handling her criminal case, he would not object. Id. at 7. Even with this, the trial judge
saw no need or justification to allow Ms. Lassiter additional time to retain counsel. Id at 9.
157. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21 (noting that Ms. Lassiter spoke with "someone" in prison
about the termination petition).
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great constitutional significance to Ms. Lassiter's parental interest, 158 there is
no reason the North Carolina trial judge's responsibilities should not have
included a "protecting duty" to ensure that she had not waived her right to be
heard through counsel. The trial judge, however, never truly considered
appointing counsel.' 59 This is so despite the fact that there was ample evidence
of her indigency based on the trial judge's knowledge that she had received
welfare. Further, her limited ability to speak for herself, which is clear from
the transcript, was likely very apparent to the trial judge as well. 16 1  The
protective model of Zerbst, despite its Sixth Amendment roots and
accompanying concern with the loss of physical liberty, puts the omissions of
the trial judge, and Justice Stewart's disregard of those omissions, in bold
relief.
Virtually every lawyer who represents poor people would likely view Ms.
Lassiter's inaction and silence far differently than did Justice Stewart.
Lawyers who represent the poor understand that Ms. Lassiter's failure to tell
her criminal lawyer about the termination petition was more likely the result of
her isolation as an inmate, her restricted sophistication and abilities, and her
limited understanding, rather than an indicium of her lack of interest.
Professor Schechter brings to light the fact that there was evidence in the lower
court transcript showing that Ms. Lassiter's only contact with the lawyer
handling her collateral challenge was a single letter the lawyer sent her,
possibly explaining why she never informed him.162 Employing a middle-class
sensibility, the possibility that she would know she could obtain legal counsel
when there was a lawyer working on her behalf on another matter is not a
credible one. Or, perhaps, it is an explanation that fails to take account of
personal responsibility. However, the poor are frequently ill-informed of their
rights and even more limited in their understanding of how to assert them.1
63
This lack of understanding is further compounded in cases where the person
158. Id. at31.
159. See Schechter, supra note 30, at 447.
160. See id. at 450.
161. See generally Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84.
162. Schechter, supra note 30, at 445. Ms. Lassiter's lawyers raised this issue in her petition
for rehearing, explaining that during the period between when she was served and the termination
hearing, her only contact with the lawyer handling her criminal appeal was the receipt of a letter
from the lawyer. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 85, at 13. The hearing transcript suggests
that the letter only concerned the post-conviction criminal proceeding. Transcript of Evidence,
supra note 84, at 5. Her appellate lawyers submitted an affidavit by the attorney handling her
criminal appeal that made clear he had not communicated with her about the termination case and
that she had never sought assistance from him with the termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 53 n.21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. Cf Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237 n.33 (2006)
(quoting RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA
235 (1970)) ("[A]II the Miranda decision did was assure to the uninformed and the poor the same
rights that reasonably knowledgeable and prosperous citizens had asserted all along." (alteration
in original)).
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has impaired intellectual capabilities or suffers from a mental disability. In the
case of Ms. Lassiter, all of these factors may have been at work. 64 In many
jurisdictions, persons who must proceed on their own because they cannot
afford counsel are nevertheless held to the same exacting standards as
practicing lawyers, creating an unforgiving fiction.1
65
The transcript of Ms. Lassiter's termination of parental rights hearing reveals
a similarly unforgiving fiction-that she was afforded a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and to defend her interests, though she did not have the
assistance of counsel.166 Justice Stewart, however, determined that the hearing
was not fundamentally unfair. 67 He accomplished this by describing portions
of the testimony of the principal witness for the Department of Social Services,
a case worker named Bonnie Cramer, and by pointing out that Ms. Lassiter
cross-examined the social worker who "firmly reiterated her earlier
testimony."' 168  Justice Stewart made note of the fact that many of Ms.
Lassiter's questions were excluded despite efforts of the trial judge to explain
to Ms. Lassiter that cross-examination required her to ask questions rather than
make arguments. 69 Further, Justice Stewart observed that both Ms. Lassiter
and her mother were able to testify.
170
One could argue that Justice Stewart's prosaic account is an accurate and
balanced portrait of the termination hearing that, by and large, was fair. The
transcript of the hearing, however, reveals a dynamic far more hostile and a
trial court judge who was as disbelieving as he was impatient with a person
clearly incapable of proceeding on her own or able to competently protect her
legal interests.171  The true tenor of the hearing and the insurmountable
challenges faced by Ms. Lassiter were apparent to Justice Blackmun, who, in
an undated file memorandum that he wrote in the first person, affectingly
observed that "[o]ne need only examine the transcript in this case to perceive
164. Schechter, supra note 30, at 445-47.
165. See, e.g., Anderson ex rel. J.A. v. Sch. Bd., 830 So. 2d 952, 952-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a student who appeared without counsel at a school expulsion hearing had
waived any due process claim of error for not raising the issue at the hearing despite the fact that
he was given notice on a Friday afternoon that the hearing would be the following Monday
morning); Rainey v. SSPS, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 603, 604, 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (holding a pro se
appellant to the same standards under procedural rules as attorneys, and denying relief to an
appellant seeking unemployment compensation for failing to meet the procedural requirements
for contents of the appellate briefs).
166. See generally Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84.
167. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33.
168. Id at 23.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84, passim,
[Vol. 59:10571086
The Right to Counsel and the Influence of Poverty
the utter helplessness and the sense of loss sustained by the petitioner when she
was forced to proceed without the assistance of counsel."
1 72
The trial judge's harsh treatment of Ms. Lassiter did not go unnoticed by
either Justice Blackmun or his law clerks. In a memorandum prepared by one
of Justice Blackmun's clerks, commenting on changes Justice Blackmun had
made to a draft of his dissenting opinion, the law clerk addressed the matter of
the trial judge's temperament and treatment of Ms. Lassiter:
I appreciate your desire not to be overly harsh toward the local
judge. I tried on pp.28-3 1 , to achieve a compromise position in this
regard-not casting direct aspersions, but still identifying for the
reader what was undignified about the treatment accorded to
[Lassiter]. Your additions on p.29 are a key bridge here.
173
Justice Stewart's accounting of the termination hearing, however, gave no
hint of the harsh treatment Ms. Lassiter received. Instead, it was informed by a
strategic use of the facts to establish that the hearing itself was constitutionally
fair and that Ms. Lassiter was not deserving of any greater measure of process
than what was afforded her. 174 Relying on statements by the trial court judge
concerning Ms. Lassiter's actions at the initial neglect hearing in 1975, Justice
Stewart painted a picture of a parent who not only failed to seek counsel at the
termination hearing, but who also contacted the Department of Social Services
prior to the initial hearing in 1975 and told it she would not be attending.1
75
A review of the transcript reveals, even more compellingly, just how severe
a disadvantage Ms. Lassiter faced. The portion of the hearing during which
she was permitted to cross examine the social worker puts the unfairness of the
proceeding in bold relief:
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to ask her questions?
LASSITER: About what? About what she-
THE COURT: About this child.
LASSITER: Oh, yes.
172. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun 2 (undated), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31,
box 341, folder I (containing Justice Blackmun's hand edits). This three-page typed
memorandum, which contains corrections in Justice Blackmun's own hand, has language similar
to that found in various parts of his dissenting opinion. It appears to be a document
memorializing his thoughts and sentiments about the case and the reasons he dissented.
However, the memorandum's affecting description of the hearing was edited down for inclusion
in his dissent; in his dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote "[t]he problem of inadequate representation
is painfully apparent in the present case." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
173. Letter from JJB to Mr. Justice Blackmun (May 8, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra
note 31, box 341, folder 1.
174. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31, 33.
175. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 22-23. Professor Schechter raises the possibility that the claim
Ms. Lassiter phoned an agency social worker prior to the initial 1975 dependency hearing to
inform the agency that she was not going to appear is factually untrue. Schechter, supra note 30,
at 438. He points to facts suggesting it was Ms. Lassiter's mother, and not Ms. Lassiter herself,
who made that call. Id.
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THE COURT: All right. Go ahead
CROSS EXAMINATION by MS. LASSITER:
Q: The Only thing I know is that when you say-
THE COURT: I don't want you to testify.
MS. LASSITER: Okay.
THE COURT: I want to know whether you want to cross examine
her or ask any questions.
MS. LASSITER: The only thing I know is that when you say-
THE COURT: I don't want you to testify.
MS. LASSITER: Okay.
THE COURT: I want to know whether you want to cross examine
her or ask any questions.
MS. LASSITER: Yes, I want to. Well, you know, the only thing I
know about is my part that I know about it. I know-
THE COURT: I am not talking about what you know. I want to
know if you want to ask her any questions or not.
MS. LASSITER: About that?
THE COURT: Yes. Do you understand the nature of this
proceeding?
THE COURT: Are there any questions you want to ask her about
what she has testified to?
MS. LASSITER: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
Q: I want to know why you think that you are going to turn my child
over to a foster home? He knows my mother and he knows all of us.
He knows her and he knows all of us.
THE COURT: Who is he?
176
The transcript leaves little doubt that Ms. Lassiter lacked both the
understanding and the ability to protect her interests at the termination hearing.
Just as Justice Stewart's opinion gives no hint of the intemperate demeanor of
the trial judge during the termination hearing,177 he similarly ignored the many
instances where Ms. Lassiter's limited understanding and capabilities
foreclosed any chance for a fair hearing.
176. Transcript of Evidence, supra note 84, at 19-20.
177. Early in the proceeding, Ms. Lassiter's mother, Lucille Lassiter, interrupted a social
worker's testimony to deny that she indicated to the agency that she would be unable to care for
the child. The trial judge threatened to jail her if she did not remain quiet. Transcript of
Evidence, supra note 84, at 14.
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III. A MATTER OF POLICY OVER PRECEDENT
The conference notes of Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell suggest that
the outcome in Lassiter was driven as much by policy concerns as by the
Court's reading of its right to counsel precedent. 178  Most of the justices,
including Justice Brennan, who would join Justice Blackmun's dissent,
wrestled with the policy implications of reversing the North Carolina decision
terminating Ms. Lassiter's parental rights. 179 Justice Powell's papers indicate
that, during the Court's conference, Justice Stewart argued, "we have never
extended these [right to counsel] rulings to purely civil cases[;] Goldberg v.
Kelly was to [the] contrary."'
' 80
Justice Stewart was also concerned that if the Court held due process
required appointment of counsel in Lassiter, an attorney would also have to be
appointed to the child in such proceedings.' 81 After acknowledging that his
law clerk had recommended that the Court reverse the North Carolina decision
and hold due process required appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in
a state termination of parental rights proceeding, Justice Powell, in a note
written in his deliberate cursive writing on the first page of a bench memo
prepared by the same clerk, conceded that "deprivation of parental rights is a
serious matter-more severe than many criminal penalties."' 82  However,
Justice Powell's policy concerns caused him to ask, "If we reverse, what
principle will prevent a vast extension of [the] right to counsel?'' 83  His
conference notes provide an even clearer insight into his policy concerns. At
conference, he took the position that "[a]bsent any way to limit the effect of
holding that the Constitution requires counsel in this case ([and] I have heard
none suggested), I agree with most of what [Justice Stewart said]. Justice
Powell further explained that he agreed with Chief Justice Burger's view "that
178. See Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31; Conference Notes of Justice Louis
F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note
31.
179. Justice Powell's conference notes indicate that, although Justice Brennan announced he
would vote to reverse the decision, he was concerned with "how to contain a holding that counsel
is required." Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
180. Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423
(Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-
71(1970).
181. Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423
(Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
182. Bench Memorandum from Peter Byrne, Law Clerk, to Mr. Justice Powell 5 (Feb. 20,
1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31 (quoting Justice Powell's February 21 notes reviewing the
memorandum).
183. Id.
184. See Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
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we should be careful not to constitutionalize every need that strongly appeals
to our sense of what would be highly desirable."'
185
Justice Powell, however, was not alone in his concern about the possible
consequences of finding that due process entitled Ms. Lassiter to appointed
counsel at state expense. During conference, Justice Rehnquist indicated that
he thought the "[Constitution] spell[ed] it out," and that there was "no limiting
principle." 186 According to Justice Powell's notes, Justice Burger maintained
that the Court had gone as far as it "should go in finding in [the] Constitution a
right to counsel.' 7  For Chief Justice Burger, the matter was a legislative
choice of "when counsel should be provided at public expense in civil
cases.' ' 88 Justice White's policy reservations were evident when he posed the
question, "Where would this lead us?"'
' 89
As noted earlier, Justice Brennan, who voted to reverse the lower court
decision, also voiced a concern over how the Court could limit a holding that
due process required appointment of counsel. 90 According to Justice Powell's
conference notes, Justice Blackmun, who initially voted at conference to
affirm,' 91 saw the case as falling within the framework of Morrissey v.
Brewer 192 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.193 Justice Blackmun's conference notes
185. Id.; Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
186. Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423
(Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The available conference notes revealed two unexpected turns in the Court's internal
deliberations. Justice Powell's conference notes reveal, somewhat surprisingly, that Justice
Blackmun had initially indicated at the conference that he would be casting his vote to affirm the
state court decision terminating Ms. Lassiter's rights under the authority of Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972), and Gagnon v. Searpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). Conference
Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in
Powell Papers, supra note 31. Other than Justice Powell's conference notes, neither his papers
nor the papers of Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall, or Justice Blackmun shed
any further light on what ultimately caused Justice Blackmun to change his initial vote to affirm.
This fact is surprising, given the forcefulness and passion of the dissenting opinion Justice
Blackmun eventually wrote. Additionally, Justice Blackmun's papers show that, at one point in
the decisional process, he was hopeful of writing an opinion that would gamer a majority, with
Justice White supplying the critical fifth vote. See Letter from Justice Blackmun's Law Clerk to
Justice Blackmun (May 8, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31. A May 8, 1981 memo
from one of Justice Blackmun's clerks explaining revisions the law clerk made to Justice
Blackmun's draft opinion reveals that at that stage, the opinion was being prepared with the hope
it would gain a majority. Id. The clerk recommended to Justice Blackmun that he omit language
at the end of the draft because it might trouble Justice White. Id. The clerk explained further that
he "tried to write the conclusion, and indeed the opinion as a whole, narrowly, in the hope that
[Justice White] would not get frightened off." Id.
192. 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
193. 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
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reveal that Justice Stevens, in fact, addressed the policy concerns being raised
by other justices during conference.' 94  According to Blackmun's notes,
Stevens argued that counsel is the "essence" of due process and that any
"slipper7 slope" could be handled by deciding such cases on an "ad hoc
basis. '  Neither Justice Blackmun's nor Justice Powell's notes indicate that
Justice Marshall expressed any policy concerns. The notes of both Justices
Blackmun and Powell, however, signify that Justice Marshall was convinced
that appointed counsel was necessary despite his belief that the case presented
bad facts and had been correctly decided. 196 Justice Powell's notes show that
Justice Marshall told the conference that "even [though] this case was correctly• • ,,197
decided on the facts, [he] will find some way to hold counsel is necessary.
According to Justice Blackmun's conference notes, however, Justice Marshall,
was unwilling to make such a holding retroactive. 98 Although the available
conference notes do not yield any further evidence indicating what Justice
Marshall might have said at conference, it seems fair to infer that he
understood a parent in the position of Lassiter needed counsel to obtain a fair
hearing.
Both Justice Blackmun's and Justice Powell's conference notes make
abundantly clear that policy concerns were an animating concern for the
justices in Lassiter.199 For a majority of the justices, it appears that policy
concerns tipped the balance for how they calibrated the justice due Ms.
Lassiter under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether framed as a concern
grounded in judicial restraint or as an institutional deference to the primacy of
the legislative branch to decide whether the right to counsel should extend
beyond the confines of cases involving the loss of physical liberty, a majority
of the members of the Court nevertheless made a deliberate policy choice that
200
affected their application and interpretation of the Constitution.
194. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31. Unlike Justice Powell, who included
his own views expressed during the Court's conference, Justice Blackmun's conference notes in
Lassiter do not document his own position at the conference or the views he shared with the other
justices. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id.; Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
197. Id.
198. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
199. See id.; Conference Notes of Justice Louis F. Powell, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
79-6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 31.
200. Felix Frankfurter acknowledged that the Court's decisional process was informed by
policy concerns and the justices' interpretive choices. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 307-10 (2007). Justice Frankfurter explained
that "[c]onstitutional interpretation is most frequently invoked by the broad and undefined clauses
of the Constitution, [and] [t]heir scope of application is relatively unrestricted, and the room for
play of individual judgment as to policy correspondingly broad." Id. at 308. He recognized
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
IV. TWISTING IT WRONG TO MAKE IT RIGHT: JUSTICE STEWART'S DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
20 1
Neither the Court's Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence nor its
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel cases provided an inexorable
command for the ultimate outcome in Lassiter. Having laid out the factual
narrative that would support his eventual finding that there was no
constitutional trespass against Ms. Lassiter's due process rights, Justice
Stewart proceeded to take on the task of examining what due process means
and whether due process in the specific context of the Lassiter case required
appointment of counsel. 202 As to defining due process, Justice Stewart first
explained that, although the concept "can never be[] precisely defined," it
"expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness. ' '2° 3  He narrowed the
bounds of determining what fundamental fairness requires to precedent and to
a consideration of the particular interests at risk utilizing the three-factor test
established in Mathews v. Eldridge.
20 4
Wasting little time or space, Justice Stewart determined that the Court's
precedent established that an indigent person's right to counsel was
205inextricably linked to the risk of the loss of physical liberty. He explained
that "as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to
appointed counsel. 20 6 In reaching this conclusion, he drew a sharp distinction
between an indigent's right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
further that "the process of constitutional interpretation compels the translation of policy into
judgment, and the controlling conceptions of the Justices are their 'idealized political picture' of
the existing social order." Id. at 3 10; see also Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation,
Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747, 756 (1992) ("Constitutional theory [does not]
constrain[] [n]or is [it] supposed to constrain Justices[; r]ather... it serves primarily to provide a
set of rhetorical devices that Justices can deploy as they believe effective.").
201. The idea for this section heading was supplied by Michael Simon, a Florida Coastal Law
School student, who used it as the title of a paper he wrote in my fall 2008 Poverty Law class on
the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act. The original source of the phrase is a lyric from the song
"Landed" by the singer and songwriter Ben Folds. See Ben Folds - Landed Lyrics,
http://www.lyricsmania.com/lyrics/ben folds-lyrics 4267/songs for-silverman-yrics 13231/lan
ded lyrics_ 153466.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2010) ("And I twisted it wrong just to make it
right.").
202. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
203. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 27 (explaining that the test "propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding
what due process requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the
risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions"); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[l]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").
205. Id. at 25.
206. Id. at 26.
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Amendments in criminal cases that involved the "defendant's interest in
personal freedom" and cases that did not implicate the risk of a loss of physical
207liberty. By doing so, he was able to use both criminal right to counsel cases
and the probation- and parole-revocation due process cases 208 to more closely
align the right to appointed counsel with the risk of the loss of personal
freedom. Equally important, however, is that, by drawing this alignment
between a person's interest in personal liberty and the right to counsel, Justice
Stewart was able to cabin the meaning of fundamental fairness and to support
the use of a presumption against such a right when physical liberty was not in
jeopardy:
In sum, the Court's precedents speak with one voice about what
'fundamental fairness' has meant when the Court has considered the
right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It
is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due
209process decision must be measured.
This emphasis on the loss of personal liberty, however, although drawing its
greatest support from the Court's decision in Scott v. Illinois, which held that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments mandate the provision of counsel to
indigent defendants only when they face actual imprisonment, 2 1 was not a
doctrinal postulate demanded by the Court's precedent. Writing for the Court
in Scott, Justice Rehnquist recast the core concern of Argersinger v. Hamlin as
one resting on the premise "that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment.' '2 1 No doubt, Scott offers
support for Justice Stewart's use of a presumption that is informed by the loss
of physical liberty. But the Court's criminal right to counsel cases prior to
Scott do not, by language or by logic, foreclose finding that due process
requires the appointment of counsel in instances other than when the loss of
212physical liberty is at stake. To conclude otherwise, however, as Justice
207. Id. at 25.
208. See id. at 25-26 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (holding a
revocation proceeding is "not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights
due a [criminal] defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations," but not
deciding the question of whether a parolee is entitled to assistance of retained counsel, or
appointed counsel if he is indigent)); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (establishing
that whether a person facing revocation of probation is entitled to appointed counsel is a case-by-
case determination, and concluding that "[a]lthough the presence and participation of counsel will
probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there
will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will
require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees").
209. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
210. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
211. Id. at373.
212. Seeid. at372-73.
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Stewart did in Lassiter, requires a type of syllogistic reasoning. Professor
Schechter maintains that cases that hold counsel was required because a loss of
personal liberty was at stake "do not establish the converse proposition that
counsel is not required when deprivation of physical liberty is not
threatened. '1 3
In Lassiter, though, Justice Stewart engrafted onto the Court's criminal
right-to-counsel cases an exclusionary meaning that linked the need for
counsel to the loss of physical liberty-which was neither dictated as a matter
of precedent nor demanded as a matter of logic. Justice Stevens' dissent in
Lassiter demonstrates this point. According to Justice Stevens, "the reasons
supporting the conclusion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment entitles the defendant in a criminal case to representation by
counsel apply with equal force to a case of this kind. 21 4  At the Court's
conference, Stevens took the position that the liberty 2 15 interest at stake was
"entitled to [a] higher degree [of] protection" and that counsel was the essence
of due process. For Justice Stevens, the loss of personal freedom was not
necessary to implicate the right to counsel.
In fact, the sharp line of demarcation Justice Rehnquist drew in Scott based
on actual imprisonment was rejected by Justice Powell, who explained in his
concurring opinion in Scott that "the drawing of a line based on whether there
is imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of
precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction can
have more serious consequences. '' 217 Justice Powell's personal papers from
Lassiter reveal that this remained a concern for him, but not enough of one to
reject Justice Stewart's use of a presumption that turned on the absence of a
loss of physical liberty.2"
8
However, in a number of earlier cases that did not involve a loss of physical
liberty, the Court showed a reluctance to attach a rigid distinction in all
circumstances to the constitutional significance of the absence of the risk of
loss of physical liberty or to the distinction between civil and criminal
proceedings. In Mayer v. City of Chicago, the Court considered whether an
indigent person charged with a non-felony offense, but who faced only a fine
and not confinement, was entitled to a record of the trial proceedings to file an
appeal. 2 19  Finding the Constitution entitled the defendant in Mayer to a
213. Schechter, supra note 30, at 471.
214. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (observing that, although it had never
closely defined "liberty," the "term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint").
216. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
217. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
218. Bench Memorandum from Peter Byrne, Law Clerk, to Mr. Justice Powell 5 (Feb. 20,
1981), in Powell Papers, supra note 3 1.
219. Mayer v. City ofChi., 404 U.S. 189, 190-91 (1971).
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transcript at state expense, the Court discounted the constitutional significance
of any distinction based on whether the sentence would result in a fine or a loss
of personal liberty. 22 In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court drew upon its earlier
decision in Griffin, a criminal access-to-court case, to reject Connecticut's
interest in the resource-allocation argument when it determined that the state's
court-fee structure violated due process by barring indigents seeking
divorce.221 That Griffin involved a criminal case and the loss of personal
freedom did not, however, present an obstacle for the Court in Boddie, a purely
civil case involving no personal liberty loss. 222 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
which did involve a loss of liberty, the Court, in a plurality opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, held the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a jury trial
in juvenile proceedings. 223 But in his explanation, Justice Blackmun offered
the admonition that "little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically
to call the juvenile court proceeding either 'civil' or 'criminal.'"
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lassiter demonstrates that the sharp line
drawn by Justice Stewart was not necessarily compelled by the Court's prior
decisions. Justice Blackmun explained that the Court used due process outside
of the criminal context to determine whether counsel was required in cases not
involving the loss of personal liberty. 225 He used Goss v. Lopez, a public-
school student discipline case, to illustrate this point.226 Although the Court in
Goss determined due process did not require legal counsel, it is nevertheless
noteworthy that the need for counsel was considered in a civil proceeding
without any reference to whether there was a risk of personal liberty loss.
2 2 7
220. Id. at 197.
221. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
222. See id at 382. However, twenty-five years later in ML.B. v. S.L.J., the Court held an
indigent parent seeking appellate review of a judicial decree that terminated her parental rights
was entitled to waiver of the fee required to prepare the trial record; the Court pointed out that it
had not "extended Griffin to the broad array of civil cases." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116
(1996). But the Court in ML.B. also explicitly rejected Mississippi's argument to "rigidly restrict
Griffin to cases typed 'criminal."' Id. at 127. In rejecting Mississippi's entreaty to limit Griffin,
the Court noted that it was "satisfied that the label 'civil' should not entice us to leave undisturbed
the Mississippi courts' disposition of the case." Id. at 128.
223. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541-42, 551 (1971).
224. Id. at 541. One of Justice Blackmun's clerks prepared a lengthy memorandum directing
the justice's attention to his decision in McKeiver and the fact that his opinion brushed aside the
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in a related context. Memorandum from
Justice Blackmun's law clerk to Justice Blackmun 24 (Feb. 6 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra
note 31; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972) (dismissing the distinction between
civil and criminal in the context of how courts evaluate a purported waiver of a fundamental
constitutional right and noting that there is a presumption against such a waiver).
225. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 36 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975).
227. Id. at 583 (explaining that the Court was "stop[ping] short of construing the Due Process
Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the
student the opportunity to secure counsel").
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In other noncriminal due process cases not involving a loss of personal
freedom, the Court has explicitly employed language taken from Powell v.
Alabama to illustrate the inextricable relationship between the right to be heard
228
and the right to counsel. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court, though unwilling
to find that due process required counsel be provided to indigent welfare
recipients at a pre-termination hearing, nevertheless recognized the essential
229
relationship between the right to counsel and the right to be heard. Quoting
from its decision in Powell, which involved a capital offense, the Goldberg
Court made the point that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 2 3 °
Despite this, the Court in Goldberg went on to concede that the appointment of
counsel is not required in such hearings. 231 However, the Court's overt use of
language from Powell in its Goldberg opinion offers an eloquent rebuttal to
Justice Stewart's attempt to doctrinally distinguish the Court's criminal right to
counsel cases from cases not involving a physical loss of liberty.232
Similarly, Justice Stewart's use of Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli to fence off the availability of legal counsel in civil cases is certainly
open to question. Most notably, in Morrissey the Court actually declined to
address the question of the right to counsel. In Gagnon, the Court held that
counsel should be appointed presumptively when the parolee or probationer
makes a colorable claim that he is not culpable of the alleged violation, or
when there is no factual dispute over whether he committed the violation
though there may be mitigating circumstances that are complex or difficult to
present.234 The Court did not mandate appointment of counsel, however, but
228. See e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
229. Id
230. Id. at 270 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
231. Id. Stephen Loffredo and Dan Friedman argue that the Court in Goldberg did not reject
the right to appointed counsel because, at the time, pending federal regulations would have
conferred a right to appointed counsel at a more extensive post-deprivation hearing. Loffredo &
Friedman, supra note 21, at 293-94. Loffredo and Friedman contend that "the Court's analysis of
the process due at the pre-termination stage assumed that any welfare claimant who did not
prevail there would have recourse to a full-blown statutory 'fair hearing' at which more ample
procedural protections would come into play" and would include appointed counsel. Id. As
noted earlier, however, the conference notes of both Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell indicate
that Justice Stewart read Goldberg as establishing a contrary principle-that the right to counsel
did not extend beyond to purely civil cases. See supra text accompanying note 180.
232. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 70. In Fuentes v. Shevin, a prejudgment-remedy procedural
due process case, the Court pointed out the severe disadvantage facing a debtor without counsel.
407 U.S. 67, 69-70, 83 n.13 (1972). The Court observed that when a debtor is uneducated and
without access to counsel, "there may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of
property-however unwarranted-may go unchallenged." Id at 83. n. 13.
233. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); see supra note 208.
234. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973).
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instead adopted a case-by-case assessment of the need for counsel.235
Although the Court's decision in Gagnon can be viewed as consistent with
Justice Stewart's focus on the risk of the loss of liberty, it by no means
doctrinally dictated the outcome in Lassiter because the liberty interest
implicated in Gagnon was a conditional one. 236 Given the presence in Gagnon
of a less than full-measured liberty interest, this fact actually undermines its
use as precedent to define the right to counsel exclusively through the
constitutional prism of a loss of liberty.
237
Justice Stewart's application of the Mathews v. Eldrige three-factor test in
238Lassiter rests on a utilitarian model of due process that was fatally weighted
down by his use of a presumption against the right to counsel in the absence of
a risk of the loss of physical liberty.239 Under this model, Justice Stewart was
willing to find Ms. Lassiter's interest in the accuracy and justice of the process
a commanding one, and one that the state shares given its own interest in the
well-being of her child. 240 However, these shared interests deviate from the
state's desire for fiscal economy.24 1 With regard to the third Mathews' factor,
the risk of erroneous deprivation absent representation, Justice Stewart
recognized that parental-termination proceedings can present difficult and
235. Id. at 790.
236. Id. at 781 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480); Schechter, supra note 30, at 472-73.
237. In Vitak v. Jones, the Court considered whether due process required counsel be
provided to an indigent defendant at a hearing that would involve largely medical issues when the
defendant was facing an involuntary transfer to a mental hospital. 445 U.S. 480, 482-83 (1980).
The Court determined that counsel was necessary. Id. at 497. However, it did not rest its
decision on a narrow definition of liberty concerned only with the risk of the loss of personal
freedom. Instead, the Court deemed that the liberty interest encompassed broader interests,
including the stigmatizing consequences of being involuntarily transferred to a mental institution.
Id. at 491-92.
238. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102 (1985)
(explaining that the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Mathews was "functionally oriented
and quasi-scientific in its methodology; it made the guarantee of due process a guarantee of
accurate and cost-effective decision making"); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72
B.U. L. REV. 1, 47 (1992) ("Utility theory balances the competing needs of individuals and
society in favor of society .... Mathews v. Eldridge best illustrates utilitarian theory."); Linda
Beale, Note, Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values: The Sniadach Tetrad
Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1603, 1643-44 (1994) ("[T]he Mathews utilitarian calculus
unduly emphasizes administrative convenience. It thus tends to undermine the principal value of
constitutional due process protection-providing fundamentally fair procedures to the individual
even when those procedures come at a cost to the general public." (citation omitted)); see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he Court's
unwillingness to consider values beyond accuracy of result in the context of a utilitarian
balancing test when deciding what process is due, and the Court's grant of a strong presumption
of constitutionality to statutory procedural provisions, amount to a serious abdication of
traditional notions ofjudicial responsibility under the due process clause.").
239. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Sen's., 452 U.S. 18, 27-28, 31-34 (1981).
240. Id. at 27-28.
241. Id. at 28.
2010] 1097
Catholic University Law Review
complex matters and that a parent's limited education and sophistication might
render the risk "insupportably high. 242
After identifying these interests and their relative weight, Justice Stewart's
due process decision balances them against the presumption against
appointment in the absence of a deprivation of personal liberty. 243  The
presumption would be rebutted in those cases where the scales weighed
heavily in favor of the parent's interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation
was high, while the interest of the state was at its nadir. Explaining that this
balancing process will vary depending on how the three factors are weighted,
the Court adopted the case-by-case standard announced in Gagnon v. Scarpelli
to determine whether, in a particular parental-termination case, due process
requires appointment of counsel.244
The Court's due process formulation in Lassiter offered little assistance to
Ms. Lassiter. Justice Stewart minimized both the degree of risk and the benefit
to be gained from appointment of counsel. First, he reduced the degree of risk
by emphasizing the state's argument that the allegations against Ms. Lassiter
245did not place her in criminal jeopardy. Thus, her right to counsel was
irreparably burdened by the full weight of a presumption against appointment
of counsel. Second, although Justice Stewart ceded the point that Ms. Lassiter
did not fully present her defense that the social service agency had not met its
duty to assist her in maintaining contact with her son, he nonetheless gave
greater weight to her failings as a parent and found that the evidence showed246
she had little interest in her son. In Justice Stewart's view, representation at
the hearing would have made little or no difference in the outcome of the
case.2 4 7  This conclusion makes clear the starkly utilitarian nature of the
Court's inquiry in Lassiter. Third, Justice Stewart's application of the
Mathews three-factor analysis elided any examination of Ms. Lassiter's
poverty, lack of sophistication, and limited abilities. Had the Court considered
these concerns, due process, as an expression of procedural fairness, would
have required appointment of counsel.
242. Id. at 30-31.
243. Id. at 31-34.
244. Id. at 32. In Gagnon, the Court recognized that its adoption of a case-by-case approach
harkened back to the ad hoc method established in Bets v. Brady to determine the right to counsel
in noncapital felony cases-an approach that was later overruled and replaced with a per se rule
in Gideon v. Wainwright. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
245. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.
246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id. at 33.
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V. A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS: A MORE MAJESTIC VISION OF DUE
PROCESS
In Lassiter, the Court viewed the essential command of due process for
fundamental fairness through a narrow and constricted legal prism that relied
on a utilitarian theory of procedural due process. 248 In fact, though Justice
Stewart recognized that the principal object of due process is the search for
fundamental fairness, 249 his search, in many ways, ended before it ever began.
The disadvantages Ms. Lassiter faced under this model were compounded
because she was perceived as a member of the undeserving poor.25° Her status
as an undeserving poor person was, perhaps, as important to the outcome as
was the Court's use of a starkly functional analysis, which rested on a
presumption against the right to counsel in the absence of a risk of a loss of
personal liberty. 51 The clear thrust of Justice Stewart's due process analysis
was that providing her counsel would not have made any material difference,
and her lack of fitness as a parent and personal irresponsibility justified a
conclusion that she was not entitled to any greater process than she was
afforded.252
The due process analysis used in Lassiter, however, did not account in any
way for how Ms. Lassiter's poverty and personal limitations militated in favor
of appointing counsel. Nor did it account for how her status as a poor person,
who was required to proceed without counsel, procedurally implicated an
equality concern.253  Certainly, had Justice Stewart not engrafted a
presumption onto the Mathews v. Eldridge test, Ms. Lassiter should have fared
much better-even under a purely utilitarian due process model. Even so, the
Court's analysis would still have been affected by its perception of Ms.
Lassiter as an undeserving poor person and the weighing process would still
have been subject to the underlying considerations of the utility of providing
her counsel.
The constitutional path the Court traveled in Lassiter elided any discussion
that might have offered a conception of due process that was sensitive to
values outside of the Mathews utilitarian formulation of procedural accuracy
and efficiency. It is the omission of values such as equality, dignity,
substantive fairness, and fairness in a primary sense that render Lassiter's due
process formula inadequate for poor people. Although Justice Stewart tied
accuracy to just results and acknowledged these outcomes are "most likely to
248. See id at 27-28.
249. Id. at 24.
250. See id at 32-33.
251. Id at 31.
252. See id at 32-33.
253. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
28, 52 (1976) ("In the realm of adjudicatory procedure, a widely recognized aspect of procedural
fairness is equality of opportunity to be heard.").
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be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests, '254 he offered an
antiseptic rendering of due process that ignored the litigation realities that Ms.
. . ... 255
Lassiter had to confront as well as her limited abilities.
From the preparation of her defense to the presentation of her case, Ms.
Lassiter was undeniably disadvantaged. How might Ms. Lassiter, as an
unrepresented impoverished inmate, prepare a defense against the state's
efforts to terminate her parental rights? How would she research her defenses?
Beyond her plaintive claims that the state agency's actions were unfair and her
denial of the principal allegations, Ms. Lassiter was not capable of doing
256
anything else to protect her rights. She could not have acquired favorable
evidence; a substantial portion of the evidence she would need was in the
possession of the state agency. She needed access to her son's medical records
and to the medical and social workers who had worked on her case and were
257involved in the care of her son. From whom would she have learned about
the procedural requirements of presenting her case? The answers to these
questions highlight the unfairness of the proceeding and the inadequacy of
Justice Stewart's due process model. No doubt, her lack of legal training alone
would be a substantial and, in most cases, insurmountable procedural obstacle
to a fair hearing, but when combined with her very limited capabilities, there
was no semblance of a procedurally fair proceeding. No reordering of the
events or the facts in Lassiter could transmute her hearing into a fair hearing.
In Lassiter, the Court's exclusive reliance on the Mathews model did not
sufficiently allow for a consideration of the impact that Ms. Lassiter's poverty
had on the fairness of the proceeding. This utilitarian approach leaves little
space for considering values other than societal costs and benefits, and any
258added measure of accuracy that more process might yield. Ms. Lassiter's
experience demonstrates the limits of the Mathews three-factor test in
responding to procedural inequality. 259 The Court's focus on calibrating the
parties' respective interests yielded what passed for a constitutionally
appropriate opportunity to be heard, but without the assistance of counsel, Ms.
Lassiter's voice was effectively muted.260 The Court's conception of due
process omitted any realistic assessment of the actual obstacles Ms. Lassiter
faced in defending the action without counsel, and notably omitted a candid
assessment of whether the process was fair in a primary sense.
26 1
254. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
255. See id. at 32-33.
256. See id. at 20-24.
257. Id. at 30.
258. See id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 27-28 (majority opinion).
260. See id. at 31-33.
261. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Fairness of procedure is 'due process in the primary sense."').
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But it is the assistance of counsel that makes the civil judicial process
penetrable and accessible to litigants. In Ms. Lassiter's case, she was laboring
under the burdens of incarceration, poverty, and limited capabilities. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court recognized that "[t]he opportunity to be heard
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard., 262 The Court in Lassiter, however, did not consider her capabilities.
263
An honest appraisal of procedural fairness would have taken account of her
poverty and her limited ability to navigate the legal system. The consequence
of the lack of procedural fairness in Lassiter was a judicial proceeding in
which Ms. Lassiter's poverty and limited abilities denied her a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
Equality, as a feature of procedural fairness, is not a stranger to the Court's
criminal right to counsel and access to the court due process calculus. The
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois, in the context of an indigent criminal
defendant's right to a free transcript necessary to gain meaningful access to the
appellate process, explained that "[b]oth equal protection and due process
emphasize [that] the central aim of our entire judicial system" is to ensure a
264
measure of equality for all participants. Griffin linked fair criminal
265procedure with the absence of invidious discrimination based on wealth.
Douglas v. California is another case in which equality was an important
element of the Court's criminal right to counsel due process calculus. As in
Griffin, the identified "evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent." 267
A poor person's inability to afford counsel in a civil proceeding results in
unacceptable procedural inequality.
Professor Rebecca Zietlow, who has argued for a return to a more organic
approach that would "foster communitarian values such as economic justice
and fairness," explains that "the prevention of arbitrary action by the state is
essential to due process, and unequal treatment is more likely to be
arbitrary. 268  She further contends that, because procedural inequality is at
sharp odds with our understanding of due process, the Court needs to
"recognize the impact of money on process, and acknowledge the importance
of procedural parity to a functional democracy."
269
Equality, however, as a factor in the assessment of the procedural fairness of
Ms. Lassiter's hearing, was missing from the Lassiter decision. It was a
concern that the Court failed to adequately address beyond a weak attempt to
262. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
263. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (relying on the three elements ofMathews v. Eldridge).
264. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
265. Id. at 17-18.
266. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
267. Id. at 355.
268. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process
Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 52, 54 (1997).
269. Id. at 52.
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demonstrate that she was able to proceed on her own, even though Justice
Stewart conceded Ms. Lassiter "left incomplete her defense that the
Department had not adequately assisted her in rekindling her interest in her
son." 270 But this omission was a decisional necessity because any careful
consideration of equality would lay bear the brutal truth that the proceeding
was fundamentally unfair in the absence of legal representation. A conception
of procedural due process that extends beyond the utilitarian bounds of the
Mathews three-factor balancing test would be less formulaic and embrace a
broader range of concerns that reflect fundamental values, such as equality,
271dignity, fairness, and the legitimacy of the process.
The Court's formulation of due process in Lassiter did not account for
human dignity as a constitutional value that was either useful or relevant to a
due process inquiry.272  Though human dignity has not yet been accorded
constitutional rank as an expressly protected value, it has been recognized by
the Supreme Court as a concern in the context of other constitutional interests
and rights. 273  For instance, in Lawrence v. Texas, which declared
unconstitutional a Texas sodomy statute, Justice Kennedy's opinion employed
language that was rooted in a concern for the human dignity of
homosexuals. 274 The immediate constitutional focus in Lawrence was the right
270. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981).
271. Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 805, 810-11 (1990).
272. The relationship between fair process and dignity values has been examined by a
number of scholars over the years. Professor Jerry Mashaw, whose scholarship on this subject
has been influential, explains that a due process analysis that accounts for dignity values "would,
in sum, reconcile procedural due process analysis with the spirit of the Constitution." JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 167 (1985).
273. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 851 (1992) (explaining
that at the core of women's right to choose to end their pregnancies lie "choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The
constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous
as ours ... no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests."); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("[T]he
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state or federal-
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174
(1952) (describing the forced extraction of the contents of a suspect's stomach to recover
evidence as "brutal" and "offensive to human dignity"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1951)
("[T]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man."). Though the Court in these and other cases, as well as individual members writing in
dissent, have given voice to a concern for human dignity, the Court has not elevated dignity to a
constitutionally protected right. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 793-94 (2006). Professor Goodman
examines how human dignity has been both an articulated and an implied concern in Supreme
Court decisions. Id. at 756-90. She concludes that, as our shared understanding of decency
evolves over the next several decades, "[o]ur legal landscape will thus reflect increasing concern
for the human dignity of all individuals who seek the Constitution's protection." Id. at 794.
274. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). Although human dignity has not enjoyed constitutional rank
in the United States, a number of nations have given dignity constitutional status. See Neomi
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of homosexuals to engage in private conduct as an element of liberty under the
due process clause. Justice Kennedy, however, recognized that "[t]he
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions. Certainly, the legal disability imposed on
homosexuals by the Texas sodomy statute trespassed severely on their human
dignity. Although dignity was not the stated constitutional ground on which
the Court's decision turned, the human dignity of homosexuals was a concern
that informed the Court's decisional process.277
Professor David Luban has examined the relationship between human
dignity and the right to counsel. First, Luban explains that "[t]he advocate
defends human dignity by giving the client voice and sparing the client the
humiliation of being silenced and ignored. 278  He then asks, "why should
litigants have counsel?" and turns to the philosopher Alan Donagan for the
answer.279  Luban explains that, according to Donagan, regardless of how
dishonorable or disfavored one's past conduct has been, a person's human
dignity is transgressed if, as an initial matter, the person's testimony is not
being offered in good faith.280 He draws from this principle the corollary that
"litigants get to tell their stories and argue their understandings of the law."
28 1
And he points out that a procedural system in which a litigant is not heard
treats "her story as if did not exist.
282
According to Luban, the need for representation rests on the understanding
that "human dignity requires litigants to be heard. 283 He details some of the
circumstances that illustrate why poor litigants need legal representation:
People may be poor public speakers. They may be inarticulate,
unlettered, mentally disorganized [and] ... [t]hey may know nothing
of the law and so [are] unable to argue its interpretation. Knowing
no law, they may omit the very facts that make their case, or focus on
pieces of the story that are irrelevant or prejudicial. They may be
unable to utilize basic procedural rights such as objecting to their
Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 202
(2008) (explaining how, in the aftermath of World War 11, human dignity became a "focal point
for human rights and constitutional protections"). The inclusion of human dignity in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a catalyst for nations to adopt dignity as a
constitutional value. Id.
275. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 567.
278. David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy
Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 822.
279. Id. at 819; see Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 130 (David Luban ed., 1984).
280. Luban, supra note 278, at 819.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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adversary's leading questions. Their voices may be nails on a
chalkboard or too mumbled to understand.284
Professor Luban's explication of the poor's need for representation is Ms.
Lassiter writ large. Although dignity did not factor into Justice Stewart's due
process analysis, Justice Blackmun's dissent was informed by a concern for
Ms. Lassiter's human dignity. 285 As pointed out earlier, Justice Blackmun, in a
three-page memorandum outlining his thoughts about the case, poignantly
stated that "[o]ne need only examine the transcript in this case to perceive the
utter helplessness and the sense of loss sustained by the petitioner when she
was forced to proceed without the assistance of counsel. 28
A rendering of due process that accounts for human dignity would support
providing counsel to indigent litigants at state expense because the lack of
access to counsel strips the right to be heard of much of its meaning in the
context of a civil justice system that is procedurally complex and structured
around an attorney-client representational model. Providing counsel to
indigent litigants unable to afford counsel preserves their human dignity 288 and,
therefore, the legitimacy of the judicial process and the rule of law. On a
practical level, a model of due process that does not include providing counsel
to persons unable to afford counsel is divorced from the realities of the civil
justice system and offers a cramped definition of procedural fairness. It rests
on the fiction that a poor person can navigate the civil justice system without
the assistance of counsel and still receive a constitutionally acceptable measure
of fair process. But it becomes far more opaque when examined through the
prism of the everyday experience of the poor in courtrooms across the nation.
In Ortwein v. Schwab, an access-to-court court-fee case in which the Court
held neither due process nor equal protection requires waiver of an appellate
filing fee for welfare recipients seeking judicial review of an administrative
ruling, Justice William 0. Douglas, writing in dissent, viewed the majority's
refusal to require waiver of the financial-fee barrier as validating a system of
284. Id. (internal citation omitted).
285. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34-59 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
286. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun 2 (undated), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 3 1,
box 341, folder I (containing Justice Blackmun's hand edits).
287. See Meltzer v. C. Buck Lecraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("[T]here cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process until every
serious litigant is represented by competent counsel."). In Meltzer, Justice Hugo Black viewed
legal representation as fundamental to the system of justice and argued for expanding to all civil
cases the Boddie v. Connecticut holding that court fees could not prevent indigent persons access
to divorce court. Id. at 958; see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971). Further,
Justice Black, who dissented in Boddie, thought the Court's decision in Boddie supported
appointment of counsel to indigents in all types of civil cases. Meltzer, 402 U.S. at 959-60. This
was justified because, in his view, absent "brute force," the courts were the exclusive means to
resolve disputes. Id at 957.
288. Luban, supra note 278, at 819.
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"judicial review whereby justice remains a luxury for the wealthy."2 89 Because
counsel is central to fair process, Justice Douglas's criticism in Ortwein applies
with equal force regarding the poor's access to legal counsel in the civil justice
system. 290 Justice Stevens's observation that counsel is the "essence of d[ue]
,,291p[rocess], made at the Court's conference regarding Lassiter, recognizes
the simple truth that absent court-appointed counsel at state expense, the
amount of due process a poor pro se litigant receives in any civil proceeding is
measurably less than what a litigant able to afford private counsel receives.
For example, can an indigent tenant facing eviction receive a fair trial when
she is forced to proceed in a summary action and has no understanding of the
procedural requirements necessary to raise defenses or the grounds on which to
seek dismissal of the action against her? Can an impoverished pro se Medicaid
recipient denied a medically necessary item protect her interest against a
powerful state bureaucracy represented by a large cadre of governmental
workers and attorneys? Can a homeowner faced with foreclosure receive a fair
opportunity to defend when he is without funds to retain counsel and the
foreclosing bank has near inexhaustible resources to retain counsel and to
litigate its claim?
A recent report issued by the Brennan Center for Justice, Foreclosures: A
Crisis in Legal Representation, points out that "[t]he nation's massive
foreclosure crisis is also, at its heart, a legal crisis [and that] [m]any
homeowners are losing their homes because they lack the ability to navigate
the landscape of our lending laws."292 The Brennan Center report succinctly
explains the importance of access to counsel in foreclosure cases:
The difference lawyers make in foreclosure proceedings springs
from the simple fact that lawyers can make claims and raise defenses
about which most homeowners are unaware. Counsel can advance
viable legal claims on behalf of a homeowner as leverage to inspire
the lender to agree on sustainable loan terms, and can also slow
foreclosure proceedings to give the homeowner adequate time to find
alternate solutions. Quite simply, for many Americans, the
difference between facing foreclosure with counsel or unassisted can
be the difference between having a roof over their heads--or not.
293
In addition to carefully documenting the importance of access to counsel in
the specific context of the sub-prime mortgage foreclosure crisis, the Brennan
Center report unmasks the faulty assumptions on which our notion of
procedural fairness rests when access to legal counsel turns solely on the
calculus of wealth.
289. 410 U.S. 656, 662 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
290. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
291. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 79-
6423 (Feb. 25, 1981), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31.
292. CLARK & BARRON, supra note 73.
293. Id. at 4.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright offers a clear-eyed
exposition of the central importance of access to counsel and its relationship to
fair process-in both criminal and civil proceedings. In Gideon, the Supreme
Court concluded that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
294
Further, the Court observed that this was an "obvious truth" given that lawyers
are at the core of the prosecutorial function and "there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get
to prepare and present their case." 295  The critical relationship of legal
representation to fair process is no less compelling or necessary in the civil
context. 296  The skills and training competent counsel possess allow
meaningful access to the judicial process and the ability to enforce legal rights.
Professor Mashaw has observed that "[p]rocess rights affect substantive
outcomes. 29 7 There is simply no quarter of life in modern America that is
untouched by the law. The importance of access to counsel as a necessary
element of procedural fairness in the civil justice system is no less an obvious
truth. When some litigants have access to counsel and others do not solely
because of the lack of wealth, justice becomes little more than a market-driven
commodity.
VI. CONCLUSION: AFTER REASON AND REFLECTION
The experience of Abby Gail Lassiter reveals the limitations of a conception
of due process that ignores the effect that poverty and wealth have on the
ability of litigants to be heard in the civil justice system. In Lassiter, the Court
asked what the utility was of providing Ms. Lassiter counsel to defend against
the termination of her parental rights. Lassiter does not teach us much,
because, in the view of the Court, counsel would not have made any
difference. But the Court's assessment of due process in Lassiter omitted any
discussion of the core value that informs our understanding of due process-
fairness in its own right and as an expression of justice. The Court in Lassiter
could not have decided that appointment of counsel was unnecessary if fairness
was a primary concern. Rather, fairness was subordinated to efficiency and
error avoidance as the leading metrics for procedural due process.
294. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 355, 344 (1963).
295. Id.
296. Each year billions of dollars are spent on legal services in all manners of civil and
criminal legal disputes by individuals, businesses, and governments. See LISA DONALDSON ET
AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES OF QUARTERLY REVENUE FOR
SELECTED SERVICES 2ND QUARTER 2009 2-3 (2009), available at http://www2.census.gov/
services/qss/2009/qssq2-09pr.pdf. In September 2009, the U.S. Census Bureau issued its
Government Estimates of Quarterly Revenue for Selected Services. This survey shows that in the
last two quarters of 2008 and the first two quarters of 2009, over 250 billion dollars was spent on
legal services. Id. Although the quarterly survey reports revenue, the reported data reflects the
amount spent by consumers, businesses, and government on legal services. See id
297. MASHAW, supra note 238, at 5.
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In contrast, the Court in Gideon, less than two decades earlier, reached the
simple conclusion that, given the central role of counsel in the criminal justice
system, lawyers are "necessities, not luxuries. 298 This observation is no less
true in the civil justice system. It was also true in 1919 when Reginald Heber
Smith inquired into how the poor were faring in the nation's courts; it remains
equally true today. The fact that personal liberty is often, though not always, at
stake in the criminal justice system does not diminish the importance of
counsel to fair process in the civil context. As long as the judicial process
provides the exclusive means to resolve virtually every type of private legal
dispute, and legal representation is at the core of the adversarial system, lack of
access to counsel based on wealth is unfair in any normative sense of fair
process.
Gideon offers more than simple instruction on the essential value of access
to counsel; it offers the Court a judicial pathway to revisit and reconsider its
decision in Lassiter. In Gideon, the Court reversed its Betts v. Brady ruling of
twenty years earlier that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not extend
to state criminal prosecutions and that the circumstances of each case
determined whether due process required appointment of counsel for state
criminal defendants. 299  The Court's willingness in Gideon to revisit and
overrule its prior decision in Betts reminds us that the doctrine of stare decisis,
and its core concern for stability and predictability, will yield when confronted
with a poorly reasoned decision or a dated constitutional axiom that, when
considered "in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life, 300 no longer enjoys the continued currency of truth or
constitutional validity.301  Can it be said that Lassiter's conception of
298. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
299. Id. at 344-45 (overruling Betts v. Brady to establish a right to counsel for indigents in
state felony prosecutions, and agreeing that "Betts was 'an anachronism when handed down' and
that it should now be overruled," without any discussion of stare decisis).
300. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
301. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912-13 (2010) (overruling Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which limited corporate expenditures for political campaigns,
and explaining why stare decisis did not preclude the Court from rejecting established precedent);
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082, 2090-91 (2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson's
rule that prohibited the police from "initiat[ing] interrogation of a criminal defendant once he has
requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding"); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
816-18 (2009) (overruling Saucier v. Katz's mandatory two-step sequence for resolving
governmental claims of qualified immunity and allowing district court judges to determine which
of the two prongs to address first); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 231-
37 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, thus requiring strict scrutiny instead of intermediate
scrutiny for racial classifications, and recognizing the limited effect of stare decisis because
Metro Broadcasting "departed from . . . prior cases-and did so quite recently"); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991) (holding that "if the State chooses to permit the
admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar," and overruling Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v.
Gathers, stating that the doctrine of stare decisis is "not an inexorable command" and that these
cases were "wrongly decided").
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procedural fairness has any continued currency of truth? 30 2
Two years before Lassiter was decided, Justice Blackmun was invited by the
president of the Aspen Institute to co-moderate a summer seminar on justice,
society, and the individual. 30 3 The seminar brought together about two-dozen
lawyers, judges, business leaders, scholars, and government officials to
examine the role of justice in society. 304 Justice Blackmun's personal papers
contain hand-written notes and printed materials from the seminars he attended
for many years during his tenure on the Court. One topic at the 1979 seminar
was "Justice and the Lawyer's Role." A handout distributed to the participants
stated "a pervasive theme of justice regarding lawyers is the distribution of
legal services, which some claim, unfairly reflects the larger injustices in
wealth and power in American society." 305 What was described as a pervasive
theme at the seminar Justice Blackmun attended in 1979 remains a sobering
reality of our civil justice system three decades later.
The year following the Lassiter decision, Justice Blackmun co-moderated
306another Aspen Institute conference on society, justice, and the individual.
His handwritten notes from a session at that conference include a reference to
the Lassiter decision and the right to counsel in cases where the state seeks to
terminate parental rights. 30 7  Underneath the reference to Lassiter, Justice
Blackmun wrote "one of PS's worst opinions," referring to Justice Stewart.
30 8
For the tens of millions of Americans unable to afford counsel to protect their
302. Chief Justice John Roberts eloquently delineated the limits of stare decisis in his
concurring opinion in Citizens United v. FEC. Roberts cautioned that "we must keep in mind that
stare decisis is not an end in itself." Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice further observed that the "greatest purpose [of stare decisis]
is to serve a constitutional ideal-the rule of law." Id. at 921. Accordingly, he explains "that in
the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this
constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent."
Id.
303. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Aspen and the Transformation of Harry Blackmun, 2005 SUP.
CT. REV. 307, 310-11 (examining the influence of Justice Blackmun's participation in the annual
Aspen Institute's seminars and arguing they had an effect on his transformation into a liberal
justice); Norval Morris, HAB, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 730, 730 (1994) (describing Justice Blackmun's
involvement over seventeen years with the Aspen Institute and observing that his participation as
co-moderator "provide[d] the philosopher's stone that transmute[d] our too-often self-serving
words, if not to gold, at least to ideas of some value").
304. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 271-72
(2008); see also Blackmun Papers, supra note 31, box 1367, folder 6, Aspen Inst. for Humanistic
Studies Program on Justice, Executive Seminar Readings on Justice and Society, Vol. I.
305. Aspen Inst. for Humanistic Studies Program on Justice, Executive Seminar Readings on
Justice and Society, Vol. 1, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31, box 1483, folder 5.
306. See Hutchinson, supra note 303 (noting that Justice Blackmun attended the seminars for
seventeen years, until 1995).
307. October 1992 Blackmun Notes from Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Program on
Justice, Society, and the Individual, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 31, box 1364, folder 7.
308. Id
[Vol. 59:10571108
The Right to Counsel and the Influence of Poverty
homes, their health, their jobs, and their civil rights, Lassiter's formulation of
procedural fairness is little more than a "teasing illusion like a munificent
bequest in a pauper's will.
30 9
309. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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